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Abstract
Blockholder disclosure thresholds are under scrutiny due to their impact on the in-
centives for hedge fund activism, which in equilibrium are jointly determined with real
investment and managerial behavior. We set up and study a comprehensive framework
of the key mechanisms at play: initial investors in a firm—who value the disciplining
effects of activism on management, but incur costs trading with activists who know
their own value-enhancing potential; activists—who value higher thresholds when es-
tablishing equity stakes, but incur costs if high thresholds reduce real investment or
discourage managerial misbehavior; and firm managers—who weigh private benefits of
value-reducing actions against potential punishment if activists intervene. We char-
acterize the optimal thresholds for initial investors, activist funds and society. When
managers are unresponsive to threat of activism, initial investors and society value
tighter disclosure thresholds than activists. In contrast, activists value tighter thresh-
olds when managerial behavior is responsive to the threat of activism.
Keywords: Hedge fund activism, blockholder disclosure thresholds, informed trad-
ing, investor activism.
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1 Introduction
Hedge fund activism mitigates agency problems that affect governance in publicly-traded
companies with dispersed owners. An extensive empirical literature establishes that activist
funds generate gains to their targets in terms of performance and stock prices (Brav et al.
2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2009; Boyson and Mooradian 2011; Brav et al. 2015;
Bebchuk et al. 2015). However, their strong financial incentives to make profits and the
relative short-termism of their strategies (Brav et al. 2010) often generate controversy.1 In
particular, activist hedge funds are, by nature, informed traders that profit from trading
on their information advantages at the expense of uninformed shareholders. As a result,
activists can impair real investment, destroying value (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995).
Our paper provides a comprehensive analysis of how blockholder disclosure thresholds, by
limiting the trading profits of activist funds, structure interactions between small investors,
activist funds and corporate managers. Our analysis reveals mechanisms that enhance our
understanding of the costs and benefits of modifying disclosure thresholds for both market
participants and society. Investors in a firm value the direct and indirect disciplining effects
of activism on management, but may incur costs trading with activists who are privately-
informed of their value-enhancing potential. Activist funds value higher thresholds when
establishing equity stakes, but incur costs if high thresholds deter real investment or dis-
courage managerial misbehavior that is the source of their profits. Finally, firm managers
weigh private benefits of malfeasance against potential punishment if activists intervene.
We show that hedge fund activism creates value when sufficiently limited, but that it can
harm uninformed investors and society otherwise. We characterize how the optimal disclo-
sure thresholds vary with economic primitives from the perspectives of uninformed investors,
activists and a welfare-maximizing regulator. When managerial behavior is sufficiently unre-
sponsive to threats of activism, initial investors and society value tighter disclosure thresholds
than activists as long as the costs of activism are likely to be low, in which case the probability
of activism is relatively insensitive to the level of activist trading profits. In contrast, when
managerial behavior is responsive to potential activism, activists value tighter thresholds.
In 2011, senior partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (WLRK), a prominent law
firm specializing in corporate and securities law and corporate governance, submitted a rule-
making petition—the WLRK (2011) Petition—to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) advocating that rules governing the disclosure of blocks of stock in publicly traded
1Brav et al. (2010) report that hedge fund managers typically receive a significant proportion (e.g., 20%)
of excess returns as performance fees on top of fixed management fees, and that managers often invest a
substantial amount of their personal wealth into their own funds. In their sample of activist events in the
US in the period 2001-2007, the median duration from disclosure to divestment is 266 days.
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companies be tightened. WLRK argued that the US disclosure threshold of 5% allows ac-
tivist investors to secretly accumulate enough stock to control target companies. Empirical
evidence shows that while activist funds create fundamental changes in targeted companies
(Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009), they rarely own more than 10% of shares and only
hold positions for short periods of time (Brav et al. 2010; Becht et al. 2017). This, WLRK
argued, undermines the original purpose of Section 13(d), and damages market transparency
and investor confidence. Academics responded, questioning the desirability of the proposed
measures (Bebchuk and Jackson 2012; Bebchuk et al. 2013). They argued that a crucial in-
centive for activist funds is the ability to purchase stock at prices that do not yet reflect the
value of their actions, and that tighter disclosure rules would discourage hedge fund activism.
In turn, they argued that discouraging activism would harm small investors, who would then
not glean the value-enhancing benefits of hedge fund activism on corporate behavior.
Despite the importance of blockholder disclosure thresholds and the heated debate,2 there
has not yet been a comprehensive analysis to provide a rationale for this rule or guidance for
potential adjustments. When and how do interests of uninformed investors and activist hedge
funds conflict? Can activists benefit from disclosure thresholds? What factors determine
the optimal threshold? Our paper sheds light on these issues. It presents a model of hedge
fund activism and shows how disclosure thresholds affect (i) incentives of activist funds to
engage in costly managerial disciplining; (ii) real investment of small uninformed investors;
(iii) choices by managers of whether to pursue potentially value-destroying activities.
Activist funds profit from secretly acquiring undervalued stock and selling it at higher
prices after they intervene. Share prices typically rise sharply when an activist’s presence is
revealed because the market anticipates subsequent intervention, and Bebchuk et al. (2015)
provide evidence that these post-disclosure spikes in share prices reflect the long-term value
of intervention. Accordingly, the main source of rents for activist funds is the price change
caused by their own interventions, and the value of the shares acquired prior to revealing
themselves is key to their profitability (WLRK 2011 Petition, Bebchuk and Jackson 2012;
2The debate is built around interventions by leading academics and important figures in the industry.
Examples of law experts promoting reductions in disclosure thresholds include interventions in the Har-
vard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation: “Section 13(d) Reporting
Requirements Need Updating” and “13(d) Reporting Inadequacies in an Era of Speed and Innovation” by
David A. Katz of WLRK in 2012 and 2015 respectively; “Activist Abuses Require SEC Action on Section
13(d) Reporting” and “Proposed Revisions to 13(d) Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules” by Theodore
N. Mirvis of WLRK in 2014 and 2016 respectively. Letters of both the Managed Funds Association and
the Alternative Investment Management Association in (2013) to the Canadian Securities Administrators
contain arguments by hedge funds against such proposals (external link here). Academic work against the
WLRK Petition includes Bebchuk and Jackson (2012) and Bebchuk et al. (2013). An example of political
intervention in line with the WLRK Petition is reported by The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2017:
“Activist Investors’ Role Needs More Transparency, SEC Nominee Says”
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Becht et al. 2017). A disclosure threshold limits the equity position that can be secretly
acquired, reducing incentives to intervene. Importantly, the expected levels of activism af-
fect the expected profitability of real investment by uninformed investors. In turn, this real
investment affects the value of activist interventions, creating a feedback effect on the in-
centives of activists to participate. The optimal disclosure threshold policy for each party
reflects the tensions faced with regard to the preferred level of market transparency.
Consider the tradeoffs faced by uninformed investors. Higher transparency (a lower dis-
closure threshold) reduces their trading losses, but it also reduces the willingness of hedge
fund activists to intervene. In turn, this encourages management to pursue its own interests
at the expense of shareholders. Uninformed investors value binding disclosure thresholds
when the expected trading losses saved outweigh the benefit of free riding on the activist’s
costly managerial disciplining. They gain from the reduced shares that activists acquire
when those shares are not needed to induce activism, but they are harmed when the share
limit discourages activism. Their optimal disclosure threshold, when interior, trades these
considerations off. In particular, uninformed investors value binding disclosure thresholds
whenever the profit elasticity of activism is sufficiently small.
Despite the long-term value of hedge fund activism (Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al.
2015), researchers have found that activist funds tend to have short investment horizons
(Brav et al. 2008, 2010; Boyson and Mooradian 2011), and that they acquire stock after
targeting a firm (Bebchuk et al. 2013). We model this by considering a large informed (po-
tential) activist fund that is external to the firm, and whose incentives to incur the cost of
intervention are provided by the increase in the value of the stock that he acquires. That is,
the activist’s sole source of rents is the increase in stock value due to intervention relative
to the acquisition price, making activism directly related to block size.
The activist endogenously determines how many shares to acquire. In our static deal-
ership model, a competitive market maker posts prices conditional on the sign of the net
order flow. Then the activist trades along with a random, uniformly-distributed measure
of shareholders (initial investors) who receive liquidity shocks that force them to sell their
shares. The activist’s order trades off between the benefits of a larger block size and the
costs of the information revealed. Uniformly-distributed liquidity trade allows us to solve
for informed trade and expected profits in closed form while preserving a key tension of
informed trading, namely adverse price effects. What matters for our analysis and findings
are how an activist’s ex-ante expected trading profits are affected by disclosure thresholds
at the moment when the activist decides whether to intervene.
The second key tension in our model is that the activist’s trading profits depend on the
value of intervention, which is directly related to real investment—value-enhancing actions
3
in larger companies have bigger impacts. When the expected losses of initial shareholders to
the activist are too high relative to the benefits of disciplining management, the ability to se-
cretly acquire too many shares reduces real investment, reducing the profits that an activist
can extract. The activist does not internalize the investment feedback effect in his trading
because he participates only after initial investment has been sunk. A disclosure threshold
can serve as a commitment device for an activist to limit his trade, and thereby raise real
investment. Surprisingly, we establish the activist never wants a binding disclosure threshold
just because it boosts real investment: as long as managerial malfeasance is sufficiently insen-
sitive to the threat of investor activism, we prove that this tension is always resolved against
the investment feedback effect—the activist never wants a binding disclosure threshold.
The negative effect of market opacity on real investment captures the original concerns
of the Williams Act (1968), which was designed to “alert investors in securities markets to
potential changes in corporate control and to provide them with an opportunity to evaluate
the effect of these potential changes”.3 Trading is a zero-sum game in which the activist’s
expected trading profits represent expected trading losses to uninformed investors (e.g.,
Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1993). When trading losses outweigh the benefits of monitoring,
i.e., when the profit elasticity of activism is small, hedge fund activism harms uninformed
investors, causing them to reduce investment. The opposite happens when the profit elas-
ticity of activism is high. By regulating these trading transfers, disclosure thresholds affect
real investment. This link between market efficiency and economic efficiency was first made
in Bernhardt et al. (1995). Here, we identify twin real effects of informed trade by hedge
fund activists: (i) it encourages activists to create value by intervening in underperforming
companies, and (ii) it affects real investment.
The third strategic agent is the firm’s management. The manager can take a value-
destroying action to obtain private benefits, but she incurs a reputation cost if disciplined by
the activist. Improvements in the performance and governance achieved by activists often
come at the expense of managers and directors who see sharp reductions in compensation
and a higher likelihood of being replaced (Brav et al. 2010; Fos and Tsoutsoura 2014). As a
consequence, the threat of being disciplined by an activist improves managerial performance
(Gantchev et al. 2018). We capture this mechanism, recognizing the ex-ante disciplining
role of hedge fund activists in discouraging managerial malfeasance. Since higher trading
transfers make an activist more willing to act if management misbehaves, they also induce
better behavior by management. We call this the managerial feedback effect.
3Quote of the case resolution Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365-66 (2d. Cir. 1982), citing GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). (External link here
). Used in “Section 13(d) Reporting Requirements Need Updating” by David A. Katz of WLRK in Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2012.
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The managerial feedback benefits uninformed investors, but, paradoxically, by reducing
the likelihood that a manager pursues actions that benefit himself at the expense of share-
holders, it reduces an activist’s opportunities to extract profit from its business of disciplining
management. When managers are sensitive to the threat of activism, initial shareholders
are happy to increase the block disclosure threshold, as their trading losses are only realized
when the activist intervenes, so they are conditional on managers’ malfeasance. Raising the
disclosure threshold both increases activists’ intervention rates (ex-post disciplining) and
discourages malfeasance (ex-ante disciplining). The same mechanism represents a tension
for an activist fund, which trades off higher conditional trading profits against a lower proba-
bility of profiting. When the activism elasticity of malfeasance is sufficiently large, i.e., when
managerial feedback is strong, activist hedge funds benefit from tighter disclosure thresholds.
That is, from the perspective of activists, the deterrence effect of managerial malfeasance,
in contrast to the negative investment feedback, is a first-order effect. As a result, activists
can benefit from committing to lower intervention rates, i.e., from a lower disclosure thresh-
old. Moreover, whenever activists value a binding disclosure threshold, it is always lower
than that preferred by uninformed investors. In effect, the willingness of an activist hedge
fund to act discourages excessively—from its perspective, but not shareholders—the desire
of management to pursue its own interests at the expense of shareholders. Shareholders gain
from an activist’s willingness to engage without having to pay in terms of trading costs.
We characterize the socially-optimal disclosure threshold and show that it rarely coincides
with the preferred policies of uninformed investors or activists. Society (a regulator) does not
internalize the transfer of trading profits from uninformed investors to the hedge fund, caring
only about the expected value of the firm net of the cost of capital and the cost of activism.
Intuitively, society is not directly concerned about trading in financial markets, but only the
indirect real effects of such trading. We show that the socially-optimal disclosure threshold is
always weakly between the thresholds preferred by shareholders and the activist hedge fund.
We next relate the paper to the literature. Section 2 studies a simple model of hedge
fund activism in which managerial behavior is exogenous. Section 3 introduces blockholder
disclosure thresholds and derives the optimal policies for the different parties. Section 4
endogenizes managerial behavior. A conclusion follows. An Appendix contains all proofs.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing body of research on hedge fund activism. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) introduced the role of blockholders as monitors of corporate management.
More recently, research has focused on the relation between financial markets and the moni-
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toring incentives of blockholders (see Edmans and Holderness, 2017’s review). The literature
on hedge fund activism underscores that disciplining management often is the business of
blockholders. The key role of financial markets follows from the strategies of blockholders,
who acquire stock in target companies before the price reflects the value of their actions.
We motivate our main modelling assumptions using findings from the empirical litera-
ture on hedge fund activism. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) and Gantchev and Jotikasthira
(2017) provide evidence that hedge fund activists exploit liquidity sales to purchase stock
in target companies. A host of papers document that activist funds enhance the value of
companies by disciplining management (Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2009;
Boyson and Mooradian 2011; Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al. 2015) through costly interven-
tions (Gantchev 2013). Brav et al. (2010), Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) and Keusch (2017)
provide empirical foundations for our assumption that managers in target companies are
penalized when disciplined by activist funds. Our paper endogenizes firm value by assuming
that investors react to the expected value of the company, which is determined by corporate
governance. While this relation has not been established in the literature on hedge fund
activism, La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) find evidence of higher investment
in markets with more legal investor protection.
Some of our predictions have empirical support, while others remain to be tested. The
model predicts that the stock price reaction that follows disclosure of an activist fund cap-
tures the value of their actions (Bebchuk et al. 2015), and that disclosure thresholds constrain
their acquisitions (Bebchuk et al. 2013). Gantchev et al. (2018) provides evidence of the ex-
ante disciplining effect of hedge fund activism.
Few papers have formally studied hedge fund activism. Our paper recognizes the role of
financial markets on the incentives of activists to take positions in a target company and inter-
vene. This property is shared with Back et al. (2018), who characterize the dynamic trading
by an activist investor. They follow Kyle (1985) by introducing stochastic liquidity trade that
provides camouflage for a blockholder’s trades. Back et al. (2018) revisit the classic question
of the relationship between liquidity and economic efficiency, and show how the intervention
cost function affects outcomes. We simplify the trading process (static) and cost of interven-
tion (fixed) in order to endogenize investment and study the role of market transparency, i.e.,
of blockholder disclosure thresholds. In these ways, the two papers complement each other.
Market liquidity plays a key role in our model. The activist fund is initially external to
the target company, so liquidity camouflages its purchases of shares and diminishes adverse
price impacts, making intervention more profitable. This positive relationship was formal-
ized by Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998) in the context of general blockholder
interventions, and Kyle and Vila (1991) in the context of takeovers.
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Other analyses of hedge fund activism share with our paper the core trade-off between the
financial benefit of increasing a target company’s value (and thus share price) and the cost of
intervention. Fos and Kahn (2018) study the relation between ex-ante and ex-post correction
effects of hedge fund activism. Our analysis shares with theirs the key distinction between
the conditional and unconditional probability of activism, as well as the efficiency gains gen-
erated by threats of intervention. Burkart and Lee (2018) compare hedge fund activism with
hostile takeovers in a complete information setting, showing that they can be viewed as polar
approaches to the free-riding problem of Grossman and Hart (1980). Burkart and Dasgupta
(2015) model hedge fund activism as a dual-layered agency model between investors, activists
and managers. Activist funds compete for investor flows, which affects their governance as
blockholders. In their paper, funds inflate short-term performance by increasing payouts
financed by leverage, which discourages value-creating interventions in economic downturns
due to debt overhang. Brav et al. (2018) recognize the complementarity of costly interven-
tions by distinct funds in the same target and model the resulting coordination problem.
Our paper is also related to the insider trading literature. A number of papers discuss for-
mally the desirability of insider trading regulations by modelling the insider as an informed
trader (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty 1992; Khanna et al. 1994). In our model, the hedge fund
activist is an informed trader that profits from trading with uninformed investors. This
reduces the profitability of uninformed investors, who then reduce their investments. Le-
land (1992) and Bernhardt et al. (1995) first incorporate this mechanism in the study of the
welfare effects of insider trading. This literature focuses on the informational role of prices
and anticipation of future trading by uninformed agents with informed traders; our current
paper combines this anticipation of future trading with how such informed trading provides
incentives for managerial disciplining. A more direct link to the insider trading literature
concerns the impact of mandatory disclosure rules for insiders (see Huddart et al. 2001).
Our paper is motivated by a debate that has been largely overlooked by the finance liter-
ature. Many calls for revisions of blockholder disclosure rules have been made by prominent
lawyers, hedge funds and academics.4 Bebchuk and Jackson (2012) provide a comprehen-
sive analysis in corporate law of the law and economics of blockholder disclosure thresholds,
and Bebchuk et al. (2013) empirically analyse pre-disclosure accumulations of hedge fund
activists. In line with their findings, our paper shows that lower disclosure can increase
investor value. This is against a widely-held view that higher transparency must provide
more investor protection,5 a view that ignores investor protection from activists.
4 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation contains a discussion
of interventions by different parties.
5See Schouten and Siems (2010) and its references for the corporate law literature; see La Porta et al.
(2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) for papers using ownership disclosure rules in indexes of investor protection.
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2 Hedge Fund Activism
In this section we model hedge fund activism and characterize the inter-linkage with real
investment. We consider a firm that raises capital for a project whose value depends on the
initial investment by uninformed investors and a business plan that may be either good or
bad. The manager can deliberately adopt the bad business plan in order to obtain private
rents at the expense of shareholders. The bad plan reduces value for shareholders unless an
outside activist hedge fund intervenes to discipline management and implement the good
plan. All agents are risk neutral. There are four dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3. There is no discounting.
At date t = 0 a continuum of dispersed investors invest capital k in a project with an
expected date t = 3 payoff of
V = f(k)
[
1− δ · 1{m=0}
]
. (1)
Here, f is a standard production technology with f ′ (·) > 0, f ′′ (·) < 0, f ′ (0) → ∞. The
indicator function accounts for the business plan m ∈ {0, 1} implemented by the manager
at t = 1. The good plan (m = 1) yields cash flows f(k) to investors. The bad plan (m = 0)
yields nothing with probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. Equivalently, the bad plan destroys a fraction δ of
the project’s value. Investors are uninformed, unable to distinguish between good and bad
business plans. We initially assume that the manager adopts the bad business plan (m = 0)
with some exogenous probability z. Section 4 endogenizes managerial malfeasance. The
marginal cost of capital is r > 0. Initial investors become shareholders who receive claims
to terminal project payoffs that they may trade in a market at t = 2. We normalize shares
outstanding to have measure one.
At t = 2 the market features initial investors who receive liquidity shocks that force them
to sell their shares, an activist hedge fund when it identifies that the bad business plan was
adopted (and by acting can change this plan) and a competitive market maker. The market
maker posts prices {Pl, Ph} that break even in expectation conditional on the sign of the net
order flow, and then traders place orders. Orders are executed at the low price Pl if sell orders
exceed buy orders, i.e., if net order flow is negative; and they are executed at the high price Ph
if buy orders exceed sell orders, i.e., if net order flow is positive. We assume that the amount
of liquidity-driven sell orders l is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, b]. We let x(l) de-
note the associated density, and observe that b ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of market liquidity—when
b is larger, an activist can submit a larger buy order with reduced risk of being uncovered by
the market maker. The activist fund is an outsider to the firm that has no initial stake but
can acquire shares if it identifies managerial malfeasance that it can address, allowing it to
profit. The activist identifies managerial malfeasance when it occurs with probability λ < 1.
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The activist can discipline management by incurring a fixed cost c, forcing the firm to shift
from the bad business plan to the good one. The activist privately observes this cost c. Other
market agents share a common prior that c is distributed on [0, C] according to a strictly
positive and weakly decreasing density g and associated cumulative function G. The activist
chooses how many shares α ∈ [0, 1] to acquire, which we term his position. We denote net
order flow by ω = α − l: ω equals the difference between liquidity sales and the position
acquired by the activist. Thus, orders are executed at Pl when ω ≤ 0 and at Ph when ω > 0.
To ease presentation, we assume that the activist cannot trade on private information
that the manager maximized shareholder value (choosing m = 1). That is, we assume that
the activist can only intervene if m = 0. We relax this assumption in Appendix B, showing
that it does not qualitatively affect results.6 For simplicity we also assume that if an activist
takes a position after management misbehaves (takes action m = 0) then he disciplines man-
agement; i.e., he does not “cut-and-run” by selling shares before engaging with management.
Cutting and running becomes unattractive when it impairs the reputation of activist funds,
which Johnson and Swem (2017) find to be important for their profitability.7
At t = 3, the project delivers cash flows f(k) if the manager implemented the good plan
or if the activist disciplines the manager. Otherwise, expected cash flows are (1− δ) f(k).
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events.
Investors
invest k
t = 0
Manager implements
business plan
m ∈ {0, 1}
t = 1
Market maker sets prices Pl and
Ph for ω ≤ 0 and ω > 0 respec-
tively.
Liquidity traders sell l ∼ U [0, b];
the activist acquires α ∈ [0, 1] if
observes m = 0, and can incur
cost c to implement m = 1.
t = 2
Cash flows
realize
t = 3
Figure 1: Time line
Parameters δ and z capture the severity of the agency problem between management
and ownership. If δ = 0, both business plans yield cash flows f(k), so there are no frictions
between investors and the manager, and thus no room for managerial disciplining; and if
6Appendix B allows the activist to acquire stock when the business plan is good (m = 1). This increases
the activist’s information rents without affecting the net value of the project. This hurts uninformed
investors, causing them to reduce investment.
7 Empirical evidence shows that hedge fund activism increases the value of target companies via costly
disciplining (see Gantchev (2013) for the costs of activism, and Bebchuk et al. (2015) for evidence on the
value of hedge fund activism).
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z = 0 the manager always implements the good business plan. In contrast, δ > 0 and z > 0
imply that the manager may destroy shareholder value to obtain private benefits, creating
a potential role for hedge fund activism. In Section 4 we endogenize the probability z that
the manager implements the bad business plan.
Parameter λ captures search frictions of activist funds or the visibility of companies that
are susceptible of being targeted by an activist fund. For instance, Gantchev et al. (2018)
find evidence that industry peers of firms targeted by activists have increased perceptions of
their exposure to activism, i.e., higher λ.
We assume that the activist correctly identifies the good business plan, that it can disci-
pline management with certainty, and that it buys shares in the target company at a single
time where shareholders (investors) face liquidity shocks. In practice, these processes are
dynamic (Collin-Dufresne and Fos 2015; Back et al. 2018), with uncertain costs (Gantchev
2013) and outcomes (Becht et al. 2017). We abstract from these mechanics to study the
incentives provided by financial markets. What matters for our analysis are the expectations
that an activist forms about these costs and outcomes at t = 2 when deciding whether to try
to discipline management. The decision is based on the balance between expected financial
benefits and engagement costs, and the likely dynamic price impacts of trading—and not
the particular paths that can be realized given a decision to move forward. In our setting,
the cost of activism c is orthogonal to initial investment. This reflects the increasing returns
of activism with respect to firm size on a reduced form that keeps our model tractable.
We represent the interplay between corporate governance and real investment in a static
setting. The impact of trading transfers on the incentives of initial investors captures price
discounts for uncertainty over managerial behaviour and activist participation accumulated
on share transactions from initial equity offerings. The agency problem owners-managers im-
poses a cost on uninformed shareholders for liquidating their shares, a cost that is transferred
over transactions between uninformed investors at any point in time. That is, subsequent
uninformed investors who acquire shares from any initial investors inherit their problem—
they value the disciplining role of activists, but face an expected trading cost associated with
possibly unwinding their positions in a market with activists, and hence would want the same
real investment as initial investors. This trading environment preserves the crucial feature
for our analysis that there is an adverse price effect via trading that reveals information
to the market (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Jackson 2012). The continuum of random liquidity
sales l lets us endogenize the activist’s position α. The uniform distribution yields a simple
closed-form solution for this position and provides an intuitive interpretation of stock sales
and purchases in terms of a firm’s shares. The continuum of liquidity shocks differentiates
our model from most corporate finance models that feature simple discrete (typically binary)
10
levels of liquidity trade. For tractability, we consider a stock market where the market maker
posts two prices similar to a bid and an ask price before receiving orders, and then executes
all transactions at the relevant price. In Appendix C we consider an alternative distribu-
tional and timing formulation in which the price function of the market maker is continuous
over realizations of the net order flow. All qualitative findings extend in that setting.
2.1 Market Equilibrium
We solve recursively for the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. At t = 2, real investment has
been sunk by uninformed investors and is observable to all parties, the manager adopted the
bad business plan with probability z, and the activist observes malfeasance with probability
λ. A competitive risk-neutral market maker posts prices Pl and Ph for net sales and net
purchases; then uninformed investors receive liquidity shocks and trade simultaneously with
the activist. At t = 0, investors anticipate the subsequent events and invest capital.
2.1.1 Trading
Proposition 1 summarizes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the subgame at date 2. The
market maker sets prices that earn it zero expected profits given the activist’s decisions, and
the activist participation and trade is optimal given the prices posted by the market maker.
Proposition 1 At t = 2 after real investment has been sunk, the market maker posts prices
P (ω) = Pl ≡
[
2[1−z(1−λG(c∗t ))δ]−zλG(c∗t )
2−zλG(c∗t )
]
f(k) if ω ≤ 0
P (ω) = Ph ≡ f (k) if ω > 0.
(2)
After prices are posted, if the activist observes managerial malfeasance (m = 0) and the cost
of activism is sufficiently small, c ≤ c∗t where
c∗t = z
[
1− λG(c∗t )
2− zλG(c∗t )
]
b
2
δf(k), (3)
then he takes an equity position
α∗ =
b
2
(4)
in the market with the l ∼ U [0, b] initial investors who sell their shares, and then disciplines
management. Otherwise the activist does not participate.
A proof is in Appendix A; here we provide the key intuition. The market maker has a con-
jecture about the size α of the activist’s position conditional on participating. In equilibrium,
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this conjecture is correct. The market maker uses Bayes rule to set prices Pl and Ph. Letting
a1 denote activism and a0 denote the absence of activism, the market maker’s pricing rule is
P (sgn(ω)) = E [V |sgn(ω)] (5)
=
[
Pr [a1|sgn(ω)] Pr [V = f (k) |a1] + Pr [a0|sgn(ω)] Pr [V = f (k) |a0]
]
f (k) ,
where sgn(ω) denotes the sign of net order flow.
A net buy order ω > 0 reveals with probability one that the activist took a position, in
which case the project is sure to pay f(k). That is, Pr [a1|ω > 0] = 1 and Pr [V = f (k) |a1] =
1. In contrast (weakly) net sell orders ω ≤ 0 are consistent with both the presence and the
absence of activism, and allow the activist to extract information rents from uninformed in-
vestors. Conditional on the activist buying α shares when participating, the expected value
of the project when there is a net sale of stock is
Pl(α) =
[
b− αzλG(ct)− bz(1− λG(ct))δ
b− αzλG(ct)
]
f(k). (6)
When the activist participates and liquidity shocks outweigh the number of shares that
he buys, i.e., when l ≥ α, there is a net supply of shares and the activist acquires the stock
below its true value at Pl < f (k). If, instead, l < α, there is a net demand for stock and
the activist pays Ph for each share, making no profit. The probability that the activist cam-
ouflages his share purchase with liquidity sales is
∫ b
α
1
b
dl = b−α
b
. It follows that his expected
gross profits conditional on buying α shares are
E[ΠA|a1] =
(
b− α
b
)
α [f(k)− Pl] . (7)
Inspection of (7) reveals that the activist faces a trade-off between the number of under-
valued shares that he may acquire α and the expected cost of information revelation b−α
b
.
This captures adverse price effects by which the expected stock price paid by the activist
rises as he buys more shares. The activist’s expected trading profits in (7) are maximized
by a share purchase of α∗ = b/2; the price Pl in (2) is obtained by evaluating (6) at α = α∗.
Greater liquidity b makes it easier for the activist to camouflage his trade, encouraging him
to acquire a larger position.
If the activist observes managerial malfeasance, he disciplines management when doing so
is expected to be profitable, i.e., when E[ΠA|a1] ≥ c. This relation and the market maker’s
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price policy Pl(α) pin down the activist’s cost participation cut-off in equilibrium:
ct = (b− α)αz
[
1− λG (ct)
b− αzλG (ct)
]
δf(k), (8)
which takes the form in (5) when evaluated at the optimal position of α∗ = b/2, i.e., c∗t ≡
ct(α
∗). To see that the cut-off c∗t is unique, observe that the right-hand side of (8) decreases in
ct for α ≤ b. In equilibrium, the activist employs a threshold strategy such that, conditional
on observing malfeasance, he buys α∗ shares and disciplines management if and only if c ≤ c∗t .
The cut-off c∗t captures two key equilibrium features. First, it represents the activist
participation threshold, and thus the extent of managerial disciplining. The probability that
the activist intervenes to discipline the manager after observing the manager taking an ac-
tion that reduces shareholder value is G (c∗t ). Thus, a higher c
∗
t implies superior governance.
Second, c∗t captures the activist’s expected conditional trading profits. In equilibrium, the
activist’s expected trading profits equal the expected trading losses of uninformed investors
because trading is a zero-sum game in which the market maker expects to break even (e.g.,
Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1993). Thus, c∗t represents the expected transfer of trading profits
from uninformed investors to the activist conditional on the activist intervening.
Conditional trading transfers c∗t increase with investment k: The greater is real invest-
ment, the greater is the project value, and hence (i) the more valuable is managerial disci-
plining, and (ii) the more profitable it is for the activist to intervene. Two assumptions drive
this result. First, the cost of activism is independent of the company’s value, so the incen-
tives for disciplining are positively related to stock ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).8
Second, the value enhanced by the intervention is multiplicative, not additive. Therefore,
the relevant measure of incentives is the activist’s dollar ownership, not its share ownership
(Edmans and Holderness 2017).9
These conditional trading transfers c∗t also rise with market liquidity b. High liquidity
increases activist trading profits and thus the probability G (c∗t ) that the activist finds it prof-
itable to discipline management. In line with Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998),
higher liquidity allows the activist to increase his position with a reduced risk of discovery,
thereby encouraging intervention. Back et al. (2018) model the dynamics of position building
by activist funds and show the potentially positive effects of liquidity. Consistent with this,
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) and Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) provide evidence that
8Brav et al. (2018) argue that it can be harder for activists to intervene in larger companies due to credit
constraints. Our model can be modified to provide a similar prediction in the presence of financial constraints.
9In the related context of CEO incentives, Baker and Hall (2004) and Edmans et al. (2009) show
theoretically that a CEO’s dollar ownership and not percentage ownership is relevant when the CEO has a
multiplicative effect on firm value.
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activist funds camouflage their purchases with liquidity trades by other parties.
2.1.2 Investment
At t = 0, uninformed investors anticipate trading outcomes and activism levels, and in-
vest capital so as to maximize expected profits. In addition to the investment decision,
Proposition 2 characterizes expected project payoffs and how they are split among mar-
ket participants in expectation at t = 0. This sets the ground for the analysis of the key
interacting forces in the model and the introduction of blockholder disclosure thresholds.
Proposition 2 The expected value at t = 0 of the project given investment k is
E [V ] = [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ]f(k) ≡ piV f(k). (9)
The expected gross profits of the activist are:
E[ΠA] = zλG(c
∗
t )
c∗t
f(k)
f(k) ≡ piAf(k). (10)
The expected gross profits of uninformed investors are:
E[ΠI ] = (piV − piA)f(k) ≡ piIf(k). (11)
The investment k by uninformed investors solves
piIf
′ (k)− r = 0. (12)
Total expected cash flows are the product of f(k) and the probability piV ∈ [0, 1] that the
project succeeds. Proposition 2 reveals that expected total rents are split between the ac-
tivist and uninformed investors in proportions piA/piV and piI/piV respectively. This follows
because the market maker earns zero expected profits, which means that activist trading
profits are extracted one-for-one from uninformed investors. The expected gross profits of
the activist equal the product of the unconditional probability that he participates zλG(c∗t )
and the expected trading profits c∗t from participating. Uninformed investors obtain, in ex-
pectation, the rest of the “pie”, (piV − piA) f(k). Real investment, characterized by (12),
maximizes the ex-ante expected profits of uninformed investors at date 0.
Proposition 2 shows that activism has an impact on real investment via its effect on the
expected profits of uninformed investors. Investors face a tension as to their preferred extent
of activism, where the extent of activism is captured by G(c∗t ). Higher transfers of trading
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profits c∗t increase the proportion of cash flows taken by the activist in expectation piA, re-
ducing the investors’ portion piI . However, higher trading transfers also incentivize activist
participation, and the increased managerial discipline raises total expected cash flows piV f(k).
As a result, greater trading transfers c∗t to activists need not hurt uninformed investors. In
particular, activism fosters real investment when investor gains from managerial disciplining
outweigh the associated trading losses, and it discourages real investment otherwise.
This mechanism underscores the investment feedback effect faced by the activist. The
value of activism is directly related to the size of the project—the profitability of the activist
grows with real investment, i.e., c∗t grows with k. But, expected levels of activism affect
investment. Therefore, expected activism affects real investment, which, in turn, affects the
extent of activism. Crucially, the activist does not internalize this investment feedback in
his trading decision at t = 2, because real investment has already been sunk. Thus, when
the activist participates, he takes a position α∗ to maximize conditional expected profits (7),
i.e., for a given k, rather than unconditional expected profits (10).
Our analysis identifies novel strategic interactions between uninformed investors and ac-
tivist funds. The linkage between investment and trading profit transfers is similar to that
found in papers studying the real effects of informed trading (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al.
1995). We incorporate a new element: the informed trader is an activist fund who can in-
crease investment value by alleviating agency problems between owners and managers (Brav
et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009, Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al. 2015). The effect of hedge
fund activism on real investment is thus twofold: Informed trading reduces the profitabil-
ity of uninformed investors who respond with lower investment; but it also encourages the
intervention of activist funds that discipline management, thereby incentivizing investment.
3 Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds
Blockholder disclosure thresholds require a shareholder to disclose stock holdings once they
reach a certain fraction of the overall voting rights in a publicly-traded firm. In recent years,
hedge fund activism has led some market participants and commentators to call for an ex-
pansion of these rules. We briefly relate our analysis to the discussion and then derive the
optimal threshold policies for investors, hedge fund activists and society.
Ownership disclosure rules are one tool of financial regulators to prevent the expropriation
of rents by large shareholders at the expense of uninformed investors. Investor protection
is at the core of the regulatory framework of most prominent financial systems, which seek
to guarantee incentives for real investment (see, e.g., OECD’s 2004 Principles of Corporate
Governance, the Williams Act of 1968 for the US, or the 2004 EU Transparency Directive).
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Consistently, La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) provide evidence that greater
legal protection of investors is associated with more developed financial markets. Both stud-
ies construct protection indices that include ownership disclosure rules. This view aligns with
the WLRK (2011) Petition, which argues that ownership disclosure rules no longer serve their
purpose because activist funds can gain control of companies with small positions.
Our model captures the link between investor protection and investment, but it challenges
the monotone positive relationship between more transparency and protection. Our initial
analysis shows how the ability to secretly acquire stock encourages activist funds to disci-
pline management. This mechanism captures the views of many academics that hedge fund
activism raises values of target companies, providing positive externalities for other investors.
The debate on the merits of revising blockholder disclosure thresholds also reveals the
seemingly arbitrary levels set worldwide. Regulations differ greatly across financial systems.
For example, the threshold is 5% in the US and France, it is 10% in Canada, but only 3% in
Germany and the UK. Despite the vast potential impacts of small differences in these rules,
it remains unclear what brings regulatory bodies to choose one specific level. The following
analysis sheds light on the impact of revisions to these rules by capturing the key mechanisms.
3.1 Optimal Policies
We now show how blockholder disclosure thresholds can regulate the level of hedge fund ac-
tivism, deriving the optimal policies for investors, activist and society. Ownership disclosure
rules may limit the number of undervalued shares that the activist can acquire, reducing
his incentives to participate. If a legal disclosure threshold α is implemented, an activist
must publicly announce his position when it crosses the threshold. Then the activist has no
incentive to establish a larger position because doing so would reveal his presence causing
the stock price to rise to Ph = f(k), which would eliminate his information rents, rendering
intervention unprofitable.10 Corollary 3 follows immediately:
Corollary 3 A disclosure threshold α is binding if and only if α < α∗. In equilibrium, when
a disclosure threshold binds the activist sets α = α.
The activist’s conditional trading profits ct (α) in (8) increase with his position for α < α
∗.
Thus, when the activist participates, he acquires a position α = min {α, α∗}. The mechanism
implies that for a given firm characterized by f (k), a binding threshold necessarily reduces
both the profits and extent of hedge fund activism. To see this, let ct ≡ ct(α) represent
the trading profits, and hence participation cut-off, associated with a position determined
10This price reaction is consistent with evidence by Bebchuk et al. (2015) that the stock-price spike that
follows disclosure reflects the long-term value of the intervention.
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by a binding threshold α < α∗. Because trading profits increase in α, activism is now less
profitable, i.e., ct < c
∗
t , making the activist less likely to participate, i.e., G (ct) < G (c
∗
t ).
A direct consequence is that managerial malfeasance is more likely to destroy value. This
mechanism is consistent with arguments against expanding ownership disclosure rules (see
Section 3.1). However, our paper shows that they only comprise part of the overall effect.
The argument is incomplete because it neglects the effects of a disclosure threshold on real
investment. Changes in expected levels of activism at t = 2 also alter real investment at t = 0,
which, in turn, affects the activist’s incentives to participate. A binding disclosure threshold
reduces the conditional transfer of trading profits from investors to the activist, which may in-
centivize real investment, creating a positive investment feedback that can increase activism.
Proposition 4 derives the consequences of blockholder disclosure thresholds by character-
izing the ordering of the optimal disclosure threshold policies for investors, the activist and
a welfare-maximizing regulator representing society. We denote these policies αI , αA and
αR respectively. We present our results as a function of the profit elasticity of activism,
εa(ct) =
∂G (ct)
∂ct
ct
G(ct)
.
Here, εa captures the responsiveness of activism to informed trading: the higher is εa, the
bigger is the increment in the probability that the activist intervenes G(ct) in response to
a marginal increase in expected trading profits ct. Absent a binding disclosure threshold,
when the activist participates he buys α∗ shares, earns expected gross profits c∗t , and the
profit elasticity of activism is εa (c
∗
t ) ≡ ε∗a.
Proposition 4 There exists cutoffs ε∗Ra ≡ −
(
c∗t
δf(k)−c∗t
)[ df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
]
and ε∗Ia ≡
(
c∗t
δf(k)−c∗t
)
, on
the profit elasticity of activism where ε∗Ra < ε
∗I
a such that
1. No one benefits from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit elasticity of activism
is sufficiently high: ε∗a ≥ ε∗Ia ⇒ α∗ ≤ {αI , αA, αR}.
2. Only investors benefit from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit elasticity of ac-
tivism is intermediate: ε∗Ra ≤ ε∗a < ε∗Ia ⇒ 0 < αI < α∗ ≤ {αA, αR} .
3. Both investors and society gain from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit elasticity
of activism is low, with investors gaining more: ε∗a < ε
∗R
a ⇒ 0 < αI < αR < α∗ ≤ αA.
Figure 2 illustrates the results; a full proof is in Appendix A. Optimal disclosure thresh-
old policies are characterized by the first order conditions (FOCs) of net profit functions
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αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA
ε∗Ra
αI < α
∗ ≤ {αR, αA}
ε∗Ia
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR, αA}
ε∗a0
Figure 2: Optimal Disclosure Thresholds
with respect to the activist position α. Corollary 3 implies that when the optimal position
is less than α∗, it can be achieved in equilibrium by a binding disclosure threshold.
Uninformed investors maximize piIf(k) − rk. The associated FOC reveals that they
benefit from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if
g(c∗t ) [δf(k)− c∗t ] < G(c∗t ), (13)
which can be rearranged to ε∗a < ε
∗I
a . The left-hand side (LHS) represents the marginal
benefits to uninformed investors of increasing the transfer of trading profits to the activist
when α = α∗, i.e., for c∗t . Higher transfers cause the probability that the activist participates
conditional on observing managerial malfeasance to rise by g (c∗t ). The associated benefit for
investors is the difference between the total value enhanced by the activist δf(k) and their
trading losses c∗t . The right-hand side (RHS) captures the conditional loss from marginally
higher transfers: with probability G(c∗t ) the activist would have participated anyway, even
if expected trading profits had not increased.
A binding disclosure threshold α reduces transfers of trading profits, ct(α) ≡ ct < c∗t .
Equation (13) shows that this raises the marginal benefits to investors of activism (LHS) and
reduces the associated losses (RHS), increasing marginal profitability. Equivalently, a binding
threshold raises the profit elasticity of activism εa, and it requires less trading transfers from
investors to encourage higher activism. Transfers of trading profits are the cost that investors
incur in exchange for managerial discipline, and this cost rises with the extent of activism.
The optimal extent of activism for investors solves this FOC: αI solves εa = ct/ [δf(k)− ct]
when ε∗a < ε
∗I
a . Full disclosure is never optimal. If the activist cannot acquire stock secretly,
trading profits and hence transfers vanish, i.e., if α → 0 then ct → 0. But then the ac-
tivist never participates. Then, the marginal benefits of discipline for investors outweigh
the corresponding trading losses, i.e., g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] > G(ct). Thus, uninformed investors
always benefit from some degree of market opacity, i.e., αI > 0: the marginal profitability
to uninformed investors of activism is always positive whenever αI is sufficiently small.
The optimal extent of activism can be achieved by a disclosure threshold when the corre-
sponding trading transfers are lower than those in the unconstrained equilibrium, i.e., when
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(13) holds, but not otherwise. The mechanism highlights the asymmetric role of disclosure
rules, which can only limit, but not foster, informed trading. If, absent regulation, the
marginal profitability of activism for investors is positive, i.e., if (13) is not satisfied, the
desired extent of activism cannot be achieved and the optimal policy is non-binding, i.e.,
αI ≥ α∗. We discuss below the role of market liquidity, which determines α∗ and thus
whether a particular disclosure threshold binds.
Our argument builds on the result that transfers of trading profits increase with the ac-
tivist’s position, i.e., dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗. It follows that restricting α reduces ct. This is not
immediate. We earlier established that the activist faces an investment feedback effect that
he does not internalize. In particular, the activist’s position at t = 2 influences initial invest-
ment k, and this determines the trading profits from a given position α. A binding disclosure
threshold regulates the number of shares that the activist buys in equilibrium. We have
dct
dα
=
∂ct
∂α︸︷︷︸
mg. net trading transfer
+
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
investment feedback
(14)
Net trading transfers capture the effect of the activist’s position on transfers at t = 2 for
a given investment k; Proposition 1 shows that these transfers increase with α for α < α∗ in
the absence of a disclosure threshold. The investment feedback effect captures the impact of
the activist’s position on real investment ∂k
∂α
, and hence on trading transfers ∂ct
∂k
. Real invest-
ment always raises trading transfers, and thus the extent of activism, i.e., ∂ct
∂k
> 0. However,
the activist’s position α might be large enough to hurt investors, who respond by reducing
investment. That is, if α > αI then
∂k
∂α
< 0, and the effect of a larger position on trading
transfers is determined by the balance of two opposing forces: positive net transfers and
a negative investment feedback. We show that, surprisingly, the tension is always resolved
against the investment feedback effect, so dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗.
This result reflects the subordinated nature of investment feedback with respect to the
direct impact of trading transfers. Intuitively, these transfers lead the activist to take a posi-
tion α∗, which, in turn, affects investment. If the reduction of investment from increasing α
was strong enough to reduce the activist’s trading profits, i.e., if dct
dα
< 0, then it would also
increase investor profits because g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] < G(ct) when ∂k∂α < 0. But then investors
would increase investment, not reduce it, benefiting activists. Because trading transfers are
the activist’s sole source of income, this mechanism explains why he never benefits from a
binding disclosure threshold:
Corollary 5 Negative investment feedback reduces the positive impact of increasing the ac-
tivist position on trading profits ct and thus on the extent of activism G (ct). However, it
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does not alter the sign of the impact, i.e., dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗: the activist never benefits from
a blockholder disclosure threshold just because it boosts investment.
Thus, when investors seek a binding disclosure threshold αI < α
∗, a conflict of interest
arises between them and the activist. An activist position that exceeds αI harms investors,
reducing real investment. This, in turn, reduces the profitability of activism and the levels of
managerial discipline (negative investment feedback). Nonetheless, the investment response
is never strong enough to outweigh the net positive effect of additional shares on activist prof-
its. Therefore, the activist never wants a binding disclosure threshold to increase investment.
Society maximizes total expected value net of the costs of capital rk and the expected
costs of activism zλG (ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]. Society gains from a binding disclosure threshold if
zλg (c∗t ) [δf(k)− c∗t ]
dc∗t
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
< 0, (15)
which can be rearranged to ε∗a < ε
∗R
a . The condition reveals that society cares about both
the value-enhancing effects of activism and real investment. The first term in (15) captures
the impact of the activist’s equity position on project value via managerial discipline. This
is positive for all α < α∗. In particular, Corollary 5 shows that the extent of activism is
directly related to the activist’s position regardless of the investment feedback, i.e., dct
dα
> 0.
Moreover, greater managerial discipline always creates value. Here, g (ct) δf(k) is the condi-
tional increase in gross value, and g (ct) ct is the corresponding increase in expected cost of
activism. The second term in (15) represents investment feedback that is not internalized
by investors. More specifically, real investment solves piIf
′ (k) − r = 0, but the optimal
investment for society sets (piI + piA)f
′ (k)− r = 0,
Society only benefits from a disclosure threshold if investors gain, but the converse is not
true. For ε∗a < ε
∗R
a to hold, the investment feedback must be negative, i.e.,
∂k
∂α
< 0, implying
that ε∗a < ε
∗I
a . Intuitively, society only cares about the real economy, and not about sec-
ondary markets (trading transfers). The only social cost of increasing managerial disciplining
is the potential reduction in investment. If this is sufficiently strong, then (15) holds and
the regulator wants to set a binding disclosure threshold. Still, this threshold always exceeds
the optimal threshold from the perspective of investors who do care about trading transfers.
That society’s preferred disclosure threshold lies (weakly) between those preferred by in-
vestors and activists also arises in models of insider trading where real investment is endoge-
nous (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995). The social cost of increasing activism is a potential
reduction of real investment due to lower market transparency. Thus, a regulator only consid-
ers implementing a disclosure threshold when this also benefits investors. Yet, while investors
incur trading losses society does not, so the socially-optimal level of market transparency is
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lower. Therefore, when the regulator seeks a binding threshold, it always exceeds the pre-
ferred threshold of investors, and sometimes they disagree on the need for a binding policy.
3.1.1 The role of liquidity and the cost of activism
Results in Proposition 4 reflect interactions of two opposing forces: (i) market liquidity and
(ii) the cost of activism. We discuss and interpret their roles by studying how market liquidity
determines the impact of a reduction in the cost of activism on optimal disclosure policies.
Formally, we consider a transformation τ of the cost distribution g that transfers proba-
bility mass min {g (c) , τ} from each realization c ∈ (0, C] to c = 0. A transformation τ > 0
scales down density g, reducing both the expected cost and the profit elasticity of activism
εa. This reduction in the cost of activism weakly increases the desirability of a disclosure
threshold for investors and society. Corollary 6 shows how market liquidity affects this force.
Corollary 6 Let cost distribution function g be such that no one benefits from a binding dis-
closure threshold, i.e., ε∗a ≥ ε∗Ia . There exist reductions in the cost of activism τ I(b) < τR(b)
such that
1. Investors gain from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if τ > τ I(b).
2. Society gains from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if τ > τR(b).
Both transformations decrease with market liquidity, i.e., τ I′(b) < 0 and τR′(b) < 0.
A transformation τ > 0 reduces the marginal profitability of trading transfers for investors
at any given ct, and they benefit from a binding disclosure threshold when the cost reduction
is large enough. In particular, ε∗a = ε
∗I
a when τ = τ
I(b), and a larger τ tightens the optimal
threshold. An analogous intuition holds for society. At the limit, as τ grows large so that
almost all probability mass is transferred to zero, activism becomes almost costless, and in-
vestors do not need to incentivize activist participation with higher trading profits. Then, the
optimal policy for both investors and society approaches full transparency, i.e., {αI , αR} → 0.
Transformations τ I(b) and τR(b) decrease with the extent of market liquidity b because
this makes activism more profitable: α∗ and c∗t both rise. All else equal, this reduces the
profit elasticity of activism, and may make a binding disclosure beneficial for investors. In
(13), the LHS decreases and the RHS increases. It follows that the cost reduction that leads
investors to gain from a binding policy falls as market liquidity rises.
These results reflect that activists require market liquidity to establish equity stakes and
profit from intervention (Maug 1998; Kahn and Winton 1998). Disclosure thresholds oper-
ate against liquidity by increasing market transparency and limiting an activist’s position
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(Bebchuk et al. 2013). Greater liquidity reduces the marginal profitability of activism for in-
vestors, making disclosure thresholds more desirable. Costs of activism work in the opposite
direction. If disciplining management is likely to be very costly, investors want to concede
further trading transfers to incentivize activism, so they do not benefit from a disclosure
threshold. That is, with high costs, i.e., large g(ct), the profit elasticity of activism is large
for relatively opaque markets, so investors do not want to limit the potential trading profits
of activists.
The cost of activism is often related to managerial entrenchment. Staggered boards make
it harder to gain control of a company in a proxy contest, discouraging activism. Our model
is consistent with Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), who find evidence
of a negative correlation between firm value and management-favouring provisions. In such
instances, relaxing disclosure thresholds can benefit investors by alleviating the negative
effect of these provisions at the expense of market opacity and investor trading losses.
4 Managerial Feedback
We next endogenize the probability of managerial malfeasance to characterize the complete
inter-linkage between investment, hedge fund activism and corporate management, and the
consequences for optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies.
We extend our model by assuming that if the manager implements the good business
plan (m = 1) at t = 1, she receives a payoff that is normalized to zero at t = 3. If, instead,
the manager adopts the bad plan (m = 0), her payoff depends on whether she is disciplined
by the activist. If the activist does not intervene, adopting the bad business plan gives the
manager a fixed benefit ϕ. If the activist disciplines the manager, she does not receive the
private benefit and incurs a privately-observed reputation cost ρ > 0. Other market agents
share a common prior that ρ is distributed on [0, R] according to a strictly positive density h
and associated cumulative function H. Because the manager only cares about the net benefit
of malfeasance, one could alternatively assume that the benefits of malfeasance are random,
and the reputation cost is fixed. To make it easier to establish that second-order conditions
hold in the derivation of optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies, we assume that
private benefits from malfeasance are sufficiently high: 2R < ϕ(1− λ)2.
Both private benefits from malfeasance ϕ and the reputation costs of being disciplined
by an activist ρ allow for multiple interpretations. For instance, managerial benefits from
acting against shareholders might be related to increasing executive compensation or empire-
building mergers and acquisitions that managers value but harm firm value. The costs of be-
ing disciplined by an activist may reflect career prospects. For example, Fos and Tsoutsoura
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(2014) report that facing a direct threat of removal is associated with $1.3-$2.9 million in fore-
gone income until retirement for the median incumbent director in their sample; and Keusch
(2017) finds that in the year after activists intervene, internal CEO turnover rises 7.4%.
4.1 Market Equilibrium
The manager employs a threshold strategy, implementing the bad business plan if and only
if ρ ≤ ρt. At the cut-off, the expected private benefits from malfeasance equal the expected
loss due to punishment, (1− λG (ct))ϕ = λG (ct)ρt, which we solve for:
ρt = ϕ
[
1− λG (ct)
λG (ct)
]
. (16)
The probability of managerial malfeasance is H(ρt). The equilibrium analysis is analogous
to Section 2.1, where both Propositions 1 and 2 extend by directly setting z ≡ H(ρt).
The solution for ρt reveals that malfeasance declines with the conditional probability of
activism G(ct): the more likely the activist is to participate after observing malfeasance, the
less likely is the manager to misbehave. We call the managers’ response to the threat of
activism, the managerial feedback effect. This effect is negative, reflecting that the threat
of activism deters managers from destroying shareholder value. Activism disciplines man-
agement through two complementary channels: (i) ex post, the activist intervenes to change
the business plan when it is bad; (ii) ex ante, it discourages the adoption of the bad plan.
The mechanism is consistent with anecdotes suggesting that executives of firms that are
yet-to-be-targeted by activist funds feel threatened and proactively work to evaluate firm
policies that minimize their vulnerability to attacks by activist funds.11 Gantchev et al.
(2018) find evidence that non-target firms, observing that their peers are being targeted
by activists, perceive a higher risk of becoming a future target, and change their policies
to mitigate this risk. Relatedly, Fos and Kahn (2018) develop a model where the threat of
intervention by a blockholder discourages managers from destroying shareholder value. They
study the incentives for the blockholder to exit and the impact on ex-ante and ex-post cor-
rection mechanisms; we analyse how managerial feedback responds to market transparency.
11See, for instance, “Key Issues for Directors in 2014” by Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and
Katz, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 16,
2013; “Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors”, The New York Times, November 11, 2013.
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4.2 Optimal Policies
We study optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies when the probability of manage-
rial malfeasance is endogenous. Managerial feedback raises new policy questions. For exam-
ple, additional trading profits increase the conditional profitability of activism (Proposition
4) and reduce activists’ opportunity to profit (managerial feedback). Do investors still benefit
from a disclosure threshold? What are the implications for real investment, and thus for so-
ciety? How does managerial feedback affect the reluctance of hedge fund activists to support
ownership disclosure rules? Could activist funds seek lower thresholds than investors?
Proposition 7 answers these questions, characterizing the ordering of optimal disclosure
policies for market participants. We define an elasticity measure that allows us to present
results intuitively: the activism elasticity of management,
εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G (ct)
G (ct)
H(ρt)
.
Here, εm < 0 captures a manager’s reaction to the threat of activism. The bigger is εm (in
absolute value), the larger is the reduction in the probability of managerial malfeasance H(ρt)
in response to a marginal increase in the conditional probability of activism G(ct). In the
absence of a binding disclosure threshold, when the activist participates he buys α∗ shares
and has expected gross profits c∗t . Moreover, the manager adopts the bad business plan if
and only if ρ ≤ ρt(c∗t ) ≡ ρ∗t and the activism elasticity of management is εm (c∗t , ρ∗t ) ≡ ε∗m. In
the proposition below, we assume that second-order conditions are well-behaved for investors
and activists; the Appendix shows that this will be so when the costs of intervention for the
activist and the reputation costs of management have uniform distributions.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the net expected profits of investors and activists are quasicon-
cave in α for α ≤ α∗. Then there exist cutoffs on the activism elasticity of management,
ε∗Am ≡ − 1ε∗a
(
c∗t
c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
)
, ε∗Im ≡ −
(
∂piA/∂H(ρ
∗
t )
∂piI/∂H(ρ
∗
t )
) [
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
− 1
ε∗a
]
and
ε∗Rm ≡
[
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
+ 1
ε∗a
(
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
)][
− ∂piI/∂H(ρ∗t )
∂piA/∂H(ρ
∗
t )
− c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
c∗t
]−1
, with ε∗Am < ε
∗I
m < ε
∗R
m such
that
1. If the activism elasticity of management is sufficiently high, then only the activist ben-
efits from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗m < ε
∗A
m ⇒ 0 < αA < α∗ ≤ {αI , αR}.
2. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately high, then no one benefits from
a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Am ≤ ε∗m ≤ ε∗Im ⇒ 0 < α∗ ≤ {αI , αA, αR} .
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3. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately low, then only investors benefit
from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Im < ε
∗
m ≤ ε∗Rm ⇒ 0 < αI < α∗ ≤ {αA, αR} .
4. If the activism elasticity of management is low enough, then investors and society gain
from a binding disclosure threshold, but activists do not: ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m ⇒ 0 < αI < αR <
α∗ ≤ αA.
Figure 3 illustrates the results. When the activism elasticity of managerial malfeasance is
high, both the regulator and investors want more activism because they gain from deterring
malfeasance—neither wants a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗m < ε
∗I
m . In contrast, the ac-
tivist is harmed by reduced malfeasance and can gain from a threshold that limits his capacity
to intervene if management is sensitive enough to the profitability of intervention, i.e., if ε∗m <
ε∗Am . When, instead, this elasticity is low enough, the ordering of optimal policies is reversed,
and the considerations of Proposition 4 dominate for the three parties. Then, investors gain
more from a tighter threshold than the regulator (ε∗m > ε
∗I
m ) because they incur the trading
losses that society does not internalize; the regulator wants a tighter threshold than the
activist (ε∗m > ε
∗R
m ) because the negative investment feedback harms society; and while lower
investment hurts the activist, it does not modify his optimal position (Corollary 5). Investors,
activist funds and society can only agree on disclosure thresholds for intermediate activism
elasticity levels m, where everyone believes that disclosure thresholds should not bind.
αA < α
∗ ≤ {αI , αR}
ε∗Am
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR, αA}
ε∗Im
αI < α
∗ ≤ {αR, αA}
ε∗Rm
αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA
ε∗m 0
Figure 3: Optimal Disclosure Thresholds with Managerial Feedback
A proof is in the Appendix. Here, we develop the intuition. Setting
{
ε∗Am , ε
∗I
m , ε
∗R
m
}
= 0
and rearranging terms with respect to ε∗a yields the cutoffs in Proposition 4. Proposition 7
reveals how those findings are altered when management’s behavior is sensitive to the pos-
sibility of hedge fund activism. The activist benefits from a binding disclosure threshold if
H(ρt)λG (c
∗
t ) +MA < 0 (17)
where MA ≡ dH (ρ
∗
t )
dct
λG (c∗t ) [c
∗
t − E [c|c ≤ c∗t ]] < 0.
The condition can be rearranged to ε∗m < ε
∗A
m . Here, MA represents the managerial feed-
back effect, which hurts the activist—well-behaving management destroys the raison deˆtre
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of activists. Higher trading profits c∗t increase the conditional profitability of activism, and
the extent of activism upon managerial malfeasance G (c∗t )—Proposition 4. However, it
also deters management from acting against uninformed investors, reducing the activist’s
opportunity to profit. As a result, increasing a binding disclosure threshold, α¯, and hence
increasing trading profits, need not increase the activist’s unconditional expected profits.
Here,
dH(ρ∗t )
dct
= h(ρ∗t )
dρ∗t
dct
captures the responsiveness of management to the threat of ac-
tivism. A large h implies a high activism elasticity of management εm, and a large reduction
in malfeasance in response to a marginal increase in the conditional profitability of activism.
Then, the activist benefits from a disclosure threshold that effectively commits the activist to
reducing intervention rates, thereby encouraging managerial malfeasance. In contrast, when
h is very small,12 activism does not meaningfully deter managerial malfeasance, and εm goes
to zero. With minimal managerial feedback, MA → 0, so (17) never holds and predictions
reduce to those in Proposition 4: the activist is hurt by a binding disclosure threshold.
The cut-off ε∗Am increases with ε
∗
a—the higher is the profit elasticity of activism, the more
the activist values a disclosure threshold. When higher trading profits greatly increase the
extent of activism, they may also strongly deter managerial malfeasance. Then, the respon-
siveness ε∗a of the activist to its potential trading profits harms it—so that the activist gains
from a binding disclosure threshold that restrains its responsiveness. In those circumstances,
neither investors nor the regulator want a binding disclosure threshold. This reflects that
the activist’s gains from a binding disclosure threshold are due to the increased managerial
malfeasance that it causes, malfeasance that destroys surplus directly when the activist does
not intervene and indirectly when the activist incurs costs of intervention. But then, investors
and the regulator value the extensive discouragement effect of potential activism on man-
agerial malfeasance. In particular, when the marginal value to the activist of tightening the
disclosure threshold is positive, it is negative for investors and the regulator; and vice versa.
Proposition 7 shows that there exists a range of values ε∗m ∈
[
ε∗Am , ε
∗I
m
]
such that no mar-
ket participant gains from a binding disclosure threshold. If ε∗m ≥ ε∗Am , managerial feedback
is small enough from the activist’s perspective not to outweigh the benefits of higher con-
ditional profits from participating. Moreover, if ε∗m ≤ ε∗Im then the benefits to uninformed
investors from deterring managerial malfeasance exceed the associated trading losses of ac-
tivism, which they incur only if management misbehaves. Thus, investors, too, do not want
to limit an activist’s trading profits, even though those profits come at their expense. In
12When the second-order conditions hold, local statements about h hold globally for all ct associated with
binding disclosure thresholds.
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particular, investors gain from a binding disclosure threshold if
H(ρ∗t )λ
f(k)
[
g (c∗t ) (δf (k)− c∗t )−G (c∗t )
]
+MI < 0 (18)
where MI ≡ dH(ρ
∗
t )
dct
∂piI
∂H(ρ∗t )
> 0,
which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε
∗I
m .
Comparing equations (13) and (18) reveals the effect of managerial feedback for investors,
MI . Equation (13) in Section 3 shows that, absent managerial feedback, investors’ prefer-
ence over disclosure thresholds only reflects the direct marginal costs and benefits of activism
encapsulated in the first term. When management responds to the threat of activism, the
positive effects of activism to investors become twofold: it increases managerial discipline,
ex post, and it deters managerial malfeasance, ex ante. Thus, managerial feedback reduces
the desirability of disclosure thresholds to investors. When h(ρ) is tiny for ρ associated with
ct ≤ c∗t , feedback vanishes, so MI → 0, and (18) reduces to (13). When h is higher, manage-
ment’s actions become more sensitive to the extent of activism. As a result, investors may
find a binding disclosure threshold undesirable even if the conditional marginal profitability of
activism is negative, i.e., even if g (c∗t ) (δf (k)− c∗t ) < G (c∗t ). It follows that if investors find
a binding disclosure threshold desirable with managerial feedback, then they also do so in the
absence of managerial feedback: ε∗a < ε
∗I
a is necessary for ε
∗I
m < 0, and hence for (18) to hold.
Society does not internalize management’s private gains from malfeasance, but is affected
by the destruction of project value. A regulator wants a binding disclosure threshold when[
H(ρ∗t )λg (c
∗
t ) (δf(k)− c∗t ) +MR
]dc∗t
dα
+ piAf
′(k)
∂k
∂α
< 0 (19)
where MR = MIf(k) +MA > 0,
which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε
∗R
m . MR captures the social impact of managerial feedback.
Society does not care about transfers of profits between investors and the activist caused by
managerial feedback; it only cares about the aggregate effect, MR = MIf(k) +MA. Formal
expansion of MR (see Appendix A) reveals that the social benefits of managerial feedback
consist of the sum of two elements, scaled by the response of management dH(ρt)
dct
to the threat
of activism. The regulator wants greater potential activism and hence weaker ownership dis-
closure rules when managers respond by more to the threat of discipline. The first element
in the expansion is the value enhanced by deterring malfeasance: δf(k) [1− λG(ct)]. Here,
δf(k) is the difference in firm value under good and bad business plans; and 1 − λG(ct) is
the probability that the activist does stop a bad plan when it is implemented. The sec-
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ond element is the expected cost incurred by the activist when it disciplines management,
λG(ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]. Deterring malfeasance means that those costs are not incurred.
The sole social cost of activism is a potential reduction in investment. Thus, the regulator
must gain from a nonbinding disclosure threshold if it benefits investors: we can only have
ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m if investment is reduced by the transfer of trading profits from investors to the
activist, i.e., if df(k)
dα
= f ′(k) ∂k
∂α
< 0.13 The profit elasticity of activism ε∗a reduces the harmful
effects of negative investment feedback, raising the optimal disclosure threshold.
5 Concluding Remarks
Hedge fund activism has generated debate about the desirability of revising blockholder dis-
closure thresholds. These rules were set to protect small investors from abusive tactics of
blockholders. We identify the tradeoffs. Disclosure thresholds may discourage activist funds
from intervening to protect small investors from corporate managers who take actions that
benefit themselves at the expense of firm value; but activist funds are also informed traders
who profit from trading on their information advantage about their value-enhancing actions
at the expense of uninformed investors. While managerial discipline creates value and in-
centivizes real investment, the associated trading rents extracted from uninformed investors
reduce their profitability and impair investment, destroying value.
We show that the preferences for binding disclosure thresholds of investors, activist funds
and society are never aligned. When investors gain from a binding threshold, they benefit
more than regulators, and activists are necessarily harmed even though, in this instance, the
binding thresholds cause investors to increase their investments. Activists can gain from a
disclosure threshold because it acts as a commitment device for intervening less frequently.
However, we prove that such commitment is never beneficial for activists when it fosters real
investment, but only when it encourages sufficient managerial malfeasance. Thus, activists
gain only when investors and society are harmed. The threat of activism disciplines man-
agers and increases investment value without the need for investors to incur further trading
losses, and the increased investment benefits society. We only find scope for agreement when
all market participants gain from non-binding disclosure thresholds. This requires that the
willingness of activists to intervene be sufficiently sensitive to the degree of market opacity,
but, in turn, that firm management not be too sensitive to the threat of activism in its
choices of whether to take actions that benefit itself at the expense of shareholders.
13To have ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m, the cutoff ε
∗R
m must be negative. The denominator is positive because
− ∂piI/∂H(ϕ∗t )∂piA/∂H(ϕ∗t ) > 1 whereas
c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
c∗t
< 1. Thus, ε∗Rm < 0 if and only if
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
+ 1ε∗a
(
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
)
< 0.
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Our analysis provides insights for policy makers. We characterize how optimal disclosure
rules that target activist investors (e.g., 13D filings in the US) are determined by multiple fac-
tors that differ across firms, suggesting that a more tailored approach is desirable. Our model
links the desirability of disclosure thresholds to market fundamentals (e.g., liquidity), firm
characteristics (e.g., market capitalization and managerial entrenchment) and the regula-
tory framework (e.g., cost of activism). The mechanisms revealed can help regulators setting
thresholds contingent on these characteristics or, even further, to evolve towards a framework
in which companies have some discretion over their own ownership disclosure rules.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Market maker. Let α̂ be the market maker’s conjecture about the activist trade, which
is correct in equilibrium. Denote ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) the corresponding conjecture about his cost
participation threshold.
The activist does not participate when either he does not observe the company take
the bad business plan, or he observes that the bad business is implemented but it is too
costly to intervene. When the activist does not participate, the order flow is negative with
certainty, i.e., Pr[ω ≤ 0|a0] =
∫ b
0
1
b
dl = 1. Conversely, the activist participates when he
observes that the manager implemented the bad business plan and the cost of intervention is
sufficiently small. The probability of a negative net order flow when the activist participates
is Pr[ω ≤ 0|a1] =
∫ b
α
1
b
dl = b−α
b
. From Bayes rule,
Pr[a1|ω ≤ 0] =
zλG(ĉt)
(
b−α̂
b
)
zλG(ĉt)
(
b−α̂
b
)
+ [1− zλG(ĉt)]
. (20)
and
Pr[V = f(k)|a0] = (1− z) + z(1− λG(ĉt))(1− δ)
(1− z) + z(1− λG(ĉt))(1− δ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))δ
=
1− zλG(ĉt)− z(1− λG(ĉt))δ
1− zλG(ĉt) . (21)
Substitute both (20) and (21) into (5) and use Pr[a0|ω ≤ 0] = 1 − Pr[a1|ω ≤ 0] to obtain
Pl(α) in (6). Evaluating Pl(α) at the equilibrium position α
∗ = b/2 yields Pl in (2).
Activist. The activist’s position α∗ = b/2 is derived in the main text, and the market
maker’s conjecture is correct in equilibrium, i.e., α̂ = α∗. Uniqueness of ct follows because
the left-hand side of (8) increases with ct, while the right hand side decreases with ct for α < b.
6.1.1 An in-depth look at cut-off ct
Analysis of (8) reveals that ct is maximized by a position α
∗∗ ∈ (α∗, b). This feature is not
relevant for the argument in the main text; here we prove the result and derive the formal
intuition for completeness.
To study ct as a function of α and k, define F
∆
= ct − (b− α)αz
[
1−λG(ct)
b−αzλG(ct)
]
δf(k). From
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the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂ct
∂q
= − ∂F/∂q
∂F/∂ct
. Direct calculations yield:
∂F
∂ct
= 1 + (b− α)αzλg(ct)
[
b− zα
(b− αzλG(ct))2
]
δf(k); (22)
∂F
∂k
= −(b− α)αz
[
1− λG(ct)
b− αzλG(ct)
]
δf ′(k); (23)
∂F
∂α
= −z
(
1− λG(ct)
(b− αzλG(ct))2
)[
(b− 2α)(b− αzλG(ct)) + (b− α)αzλG(ct)
]
δf(k).(24)
For α < b, we have ∂F
∂ct
> 0 and ∂F
∂k
< 0. Thus, ct increases with investment, i.e.,
∂ct
∂k
> 0.
Inspection of (24) reveals that the sign of ∂F
∂α
is determined by the term in brackets, which
can be rearranged to α2zλG(ct)− α2b+ b2. Solving (24)=0 for α yields
α∗∗ =
b
[
1−√1− zλG(ct)]
zλG(ct)
∈
(
b
2
, b
)
and α∗∗ =
b
[
1 +
√
1− zλG(ct)
]
zλG(ct)
> b (25)
with ∂F
∂α
> 0 ⇔ α ∈ (α∗∗, α∗∗ ). To verify α∗∗ ∈ ( b
2
, b
)
notice that α∗∗ increases with
zλG(ct) ∈ (0, 1). Further analysis reveals limzλG(ct)→1α∗∗ = b, and applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule
yields limzλG(ct)→0α
∗∗ = b/2. To show α∗∗ > b use the same intuition and note that α∗∗
decreases with zλG(ct). It is immediate that
∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α < α∗∗, and ∂ct
∂α
< 0 for α ∈ (α∗∗, b].
Intuitively, the result reveals that for a given initial investment k, the activist would max-
imize gross expected profits and participation by committing to a larger position α∗∗ ∈ (α∗, b)
when participating before prices were posted. This follows from price function Pl(α) in (6),
which decreases with the activist position reflecting that the bigger the stock purchase condi-
tional on participating, the less likely is activism from the market maker’s perspective given
a net sale of stock ω ≤ 0. This market feedback is not internalized by the activist because
prices are set before traders place orders. If the activist could commit to a more aggressive
trade, he would benefit from both a lower price and a larger number of undervalued shares
whenever his stock purchase was concealed by liquidity sales, which would occur with a
smaller probability. In equilibrium, the inability to commit leads the activist to acquire a
smaller position α∗ when he participates.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Gross expected profits. Consider an arbitrary position α. The unconditional project
value E[V ] in Proposition 2 weighs cash flows f(k) with the probabilities that (i) the man-
ager implements the good business plan, 1 − z; (ii) the manager implements the bad plan
but is disciplined by the activist, zλG(ct); (iii) the manager implements the bad plan and is
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not disciplined by the activist but the project succeeds anyway, z[1− λG(ct)](1− δ).
The activist’s gross profits are obtained by weighting his conditional profits E[ΠA|a1]
with the probability of participation zλG(ct),
E[ΠA] = piAf(k)
with piA = zλG(ct)(b− α)αz
[
1− λG (ct)
b− αzλG (ct)
]
δ
= zλG(ct)
ct
f(k)
. (26)
By construction, expected investors’ profits are the residual E[ΠI ] = [piV − piA] f (k),
E[ΠI ] = piIf(k)
with piI = [1− z(1− λG(ct))δ]− zλG(ct)(b− α)αz
[
1− λG (ct)
b− αzλG (ct)
]
δ
= [1− z(1− λG(ct))δ]− zλG(ct) ct
f(k)
. (27)
Proposition 2 provides expressions for expected profits in equilibrium, substituting α =
α∗ = b/2. Rearranging piA as a function of ct shows that α affects expected profits only
through trading transfers ct and capital, i.e., E[ΠA](ct(α), k(α)) and E[ΠI ](ct(α), k(α)).
Real Investment. The first-order condition for investors’ net profits piIf(k) − rk charac-
terizes real investment. Note that while piI is a function of both activism and investment,
small investors are price takers who do not internalize the effects of their own investment.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Investors. Investor net expected profits are piIf (k)− rk. To derive their optimal disclosure
threshold we differentiate with respect to α:
d
dα
{piIf(k)− rk} =
[
∂piI
∂ct
dct
dα
+
∂piI
∂k
∂k
∂α
]
f (k) + [piIf
′ (k)− r] ∂k
∂α
(28)
where piI is given by (27) and ct is characterized in (8). We show that (28) is strictly positive
at α = 0, implying that investors always benefit from some degree of market opacity, i.e.,
αI > 0. We then prove that (28) decreases in α for α < α
∗. Therefore, if (28) is negative at
α = α∗, then the optimal disclosure threshold αI solves (28) = 0 and αI < α∗. If, instead,
(28) is positive at α = α∗, then the optimal threshold is non-binding, i.e., αI ≥ α∗.
Analysis of (28) simplifies because of two properties. First, Proposition 2 shows that in
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equilibrium piIf
′ (k)−r = 0, so the last term of (28) vanishes. Second, any interior maximum
of piIf (k)− rk satisfies ∂k∂α = 0 because the activist position that maximizes investor profits,
also maximizes investment.14 Using these two features and the expansion dct
dα
= ∂ct
∂α
+ ∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α
,
it follows from (28) that any interior solution αI < α
∗ solves ∂piI
∂ct
∂ct
∂α
f (k) = 0. The proof of
Proposition 1 shows that ∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α < α∗∗ and α∗ < α∗∗. Therefore, if there is an interior
solution αI < α
∗, it must be characterized by ∂piI
∂ct
= 0, where
∂piI
∂ct
=
zλ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] . (29)
Because g(c) is decreasing in c, (29) decreases with ct.
At α = 0, activist trading profits are zero, i.e., ct = 0. It follows that if α = 0 then
(29) > 0, and thus (28) > 0. Therefore, investors always benefit from some degree of market
opacity, i.e., from αI > 0. We prove below that trading transfers increase with the activist’s
position α < α∗ despite investment feedback, i.e., that dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗—see the activist
section of the proof. Hence, (29) decreases with α for α < α∗, and the same is true for (28).
A binding optimal threshold exists if and only if (28) < 0 for α = α∗. Moreover, it satisfies
(28) = 0. The condition (28) < 0 can be rearranged as ε∗Ia < ε
∗
a.
Activist. Net expected activist profits are
piAf (k)− zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] = zλG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] , (30)
where the right-hand side uses the solution for piA in Proposition 2. Here, zλG (ct) is the
probability that the activist participates, i.e., the probability that (i) the manager adopts the
bad business plan, (ii) the activist observes it, and (iii) his cost of intervention is sufficiently
small. Conditional on intervention being optimal, his expected profits are the difference
between trading profits ct and the cost of disciplining management, which is expected to be
E [c|c ≤ ct] =
[∫ ct
0
cg (c) dc
]
/G (ct). To derive the activist’s optimal disclosure threshold, we
differentiate with respect to α:
d
dα
{zλG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]} = zλG (ct) dct
dα
. (31)
14From the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂k∂α = −
∂piI
∂ct
∂ct
∂α f
′(k)
piIf ′′(k)
, where the denominator is negative. The
proof of Proposition 4 continues by showing that the numerator in this expression characterizes the sign of
(28). Therefore, ∂k∂α > 0 if and only if
d
dα {piIf(k)− rk} > 0.
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The result follows because
dE [c|c ≤ ct]
dα
=
∂E [c|c ≤ ct]
∂ct
dct
dα
(32)
=
g (ct)
G (ct)
[
∂
∂ct
{∫ ct
0
cg (c) dc
}
g (ct)
− E [c|c ≤ ct]
]
dct
dα
=
g (ct)
G (ct)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] dct
dα
where the last line uses ∂
∂ct
{∫ ct
0
cg (c) dc
}
= g (ct) ct.
The sign of (31) is determined by dct
dα
= ∂ct
∂α
+ ∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α
. Proof of Proposition 1 shows ∂ct
∂α
> 0
for α < α∗∗ with α∗ < α∗∗, and that ∂ct
∂k
> 0. Hence, for the activist to gain from a binding
disclosure threshold it must be that ∂k
∂α
< −∂ct/∂α
∂ct/∂k
for α < α∗, i.e., that the negative invest-
ment response to activism by investors is strong enough to outweigh the positive marginal
net trading transfers. We prove that this cannot be so by contradiction.
If ∂k
∂α
< 0, a marginal increase in the activist’s position must hurt investors, implying
that ∂piI
∂ct
< 0. Suppose that the investment feedback satisfies ∂k
∂α
< −∂ct/∂α
∂ct/∂k
and thus that
dct
dα
< 0. By assumption increasing α reduces ct, so it must increase investor profits because
∂piI
∂ct
< 0. But this higher profitability leads investors to increase capital when the activist
increases his position ∂k
∂α
> 0, a contradiction. It follows that dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗.
This argument yields that αA ≥ α∗ in the absence of managerial feedback, yielding Corol-
lary 5. This result is used above to solve for the optimal disclosure threshold of investors.
Regulator. The regulator maximizes the project value net of capital costs and expected
activism costs, maximizing
piV f(k)− rk − zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] , (33)
where piV is given in Proposition 2. To derive the optimal disclosure threshold for society,
we differentiate (33) with respect to α:
d
dα
{piV f(k)− rk − zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]} (34)
=
∂piV
∂ct
dct
dα
f(k) + piV f
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
− r ∂k
∂α
− zλ
[
g (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] +G (ct) dE [c|c ≤ ct]
dct
]
dct
dα
=
∂piV
∂ct
dct
dα
f(k) + [piV f
′ (k)− r] ∂k
∂α
− zλg (ct) ctdct
dα
(35)
=
[
∂piV
∂ct
f(k)− zλg (ct) ct
]
dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
. (36)
34
where the second equality (35) uses (32); the third equality (36) rearranges (35) using
both equilibrium relationships piIf
′ (k) − r = 0 (optimal investment by the investors) and
piV = piI + piA from Proposition 2. Next, in (36) substitute for
∂piV
∂ct
= zδλg (ct) obtained by
differentiating the expression for piV in Proposition 2, and use piA = zλG (ct)
ct
f(k)
to obtain
(34) = zλg (ct) [δf(k)− ct] dct
dα
+ zλG (ct)
ct
f (k)
f ′ (k)
∂k
∂α
(37)
=
sign
g (ct) [δf(k)− ct] dct
dα
+G (ct) ct
f ′ (k)
f (k)
∂k
∂α
.
The first line of (37) corresponds to the condition in (15). The second line of (37) can be
rearranged to obtain the expression for ε∗Ra in Proposition 4 by noting that
df(k)
dα
= f ′ (k) ∂k
∂α
.
It has been shown that dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗. Moreover δf(k)− ct > 0 because ct increases
with α < α∗ and from (3) it follows that δf(k) − c∗t > 0. Thus, ∂k∂α < 0 is a necessary
condition for a binding disclosure threshold to be optimal for the regulator, and ε∗Ra < ε
∗I
a .
6.4 Proof of Corollary 6
We prove Corollary 6 in three steps.
1. A transfer τ > 0 always reduces g(ct) and increases G(ct). A transfer τ > 0 creates both
a direct and an indirect effect on g(ct). The direct effect reduces g(ct) and increases G(ct) for
any given ct ∈ (0, C]. The indirect effect reduces ct. In particular, from both (8) and the Im-
plicit Function Theorem, ct decreases in G. Thus, the increase in G caused by the direct effect
diminishes ct. The two effects have opposite effects on g(ct), but the direct effect always out-
weighs the indirect effect, so the transfer unambiguously reduces g(ct) and increasesG(ct). To
see this, suppose that a transfer τ > 0 leads to a bigger g(ct), so the decrease in ct outweighs
the reduction of g. It follows that G(ct) is smaller, and therefore ct is larger, a contradiction.
2. There exist cutoffs τ I and τR such that ε∗a < ε
∗I
a if and only if τ
I > τ , and ε∗a < ε
∗R
a if
and only if τR > τ . Moreover, τ I < τR. We showed that any transfer τ > 0 reduces both ct
and g(ct), and increases G(ct). From the characterizations in Proposition 4, it follows that
ε∗a, ε
∗I
a and ε
∗R
a decrease with a transfer τ > 0. Consider now the biggest possible transfer
τ = sup {g}, so that all probability mass accumulates at c = 0. Then, for any ct > 0, we have
g(ct) = 0 and G(ct) = 1. From the characterizations of cutoffs ε
∗
a, ε
∗I
a and ε
∗R
a in Proposition
4, it follows that a transfer τ = sup {g} yields ε∗a = 0, and ε∗Ia > ε∗Ra > 0. By continuity,
there exist cutoffs
{
τ I , τR
} ∈ (0, sup {g}]. Since ε∗Ra < ε∗Ia , these thresholds satisfy τ I < τR.
3. Cutoffs τ I and τR decrease with market liquidity b. Ceteris paribus, higher liquidity b
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raises ct, and reduces marginal profits of investors g(ct) [δf(k)− ct]−G(ct). Thus, a smaller
transfer τ I is needed for ε∗Ia < ε
∗
a. When g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] < G(ct), raising trading transfers ct
makes investors’ marginal profits more negative, and raises the negative investment feedback
∂k
∂α
< 0. From (37) it follows that marginal profits for society eventually become negative.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We derive the critical cutoffs {εIm, εAm, εRm} in an analysis that mirrors the proof of Proposition
4 incorporating z ≡ H
(
ϕ
[
1−λG(ct)
λG(ct)
])
. The proof then compares the cutoffs and derives the
implications for optimal disclosure thresholds. Finally, it shows that second order conditions
hold when the costs of activism and reputation costs are uniformly distributed.
We first verify that the partial effects of α and k on trading transfers ct preserve the same
sign. Substituting H(ρt) for z in the function F defined in the Proof of Proposition 1 yields
∂F
∂ct
= 1−
[
(b− α)αδf(k)
b− αH(ρt)λG(ct)
](
dH(ρt)
dct
(1− λG(ct))−H(ρt)λg(ct)
)
(38)
−
[
(b− α)αδf(k)
(b− αH(ρt)λG(ct))2
]
H(ρt)(1− λG(ct))αλ
(
dH(ρt)
dct
G(ct) +H(ρt)g(ct)
)
= 1−
[
(b− α)αδf(k)
b− αH(ρt)λG(ct)
]
dH(ρt)
dct
(1− λG(ct))
(
1 +
αH(ρt)λG(ct)
b− αH(ρt)λG(ct)
)
+
[
(b− α)αδf(k)
b− αH(ρt)λG(ct)
]
H(ρt)λg(ct)
(
1− αH(ρt)(1− λG(ct))
b− αH(ρt)λG(ct)
)
,
where the second equality follows from rearranging. The expressions for ∂F
∂k
and ∂F
∂α
follow
from substituting H(ρt) for z in (23) and (24) respectively.
The first line in the second equality of (38) is positive because dH(ρt)
dct
< 0. The second
line is positive because
(
1− αH(ρt)(1−λG(ct))
b−αH(ρt)λG(ct)
)
> 0. Thus, ∂F
∂ct
> 0. Moreover, the Proof of
Proposition 1 shows that ∂F
∂k
< 0, and that ∂F
∂α
< 0 for α < α∗∗ and ∂F
∂α
> 0 for α ∈ (α∗∗, b).
From the IFT it follows that ∂ct
∂k
> 0 and ∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α < α∗∗ and ∂ct
∂α
< 0 for α ∈ (α∗∗, b].
Therefore, adding managerial feedback to the benchmark setting developed in Section 2 does
not alter the signs of the effects of α and k on trading transfers ct.
Investors. The derivative of investors’ net profits with respect to α is given by (28). If no
interior solution exists, then investors do not benefit from a disclosure threshold, i.e., αI ≥ α∗.
In equilibrium, piIf
′ (k) − r = 0 and ∂k
∂α
= 0 at an interior maximum, αI < α
∗. Use
dct
dα
= ∂ct
∂α
+ ∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α
to simplify (28) to ∂piI
∂ct
∂ct
∂α
f (k). We have ∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α < α∗∗ with α∗ < α∗∗,
and ∂ct
∂k
> 0. Hence, an interior maximum αI < α
∗ is characterized by ∂piI
∂ct
= 0, where
36
∂piI
∂ct
=
H (ρt)λ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] + dH (ρt)
dct
∂piI
∂H (ρt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MI
(39)
Here,dH(ρt)
dct
= h (ρt)
dρt
dct
= g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
and ∂piI
∂H(ρt)
= −
[
δ (1− λG (ct)) + λG (ct) ctf(k)
]
. Be-
cause MI > 0, managerial feedback raises the marginal profitability of a higher cutoff to
investors. At α = 0, activist trading profits are zero, so ct = 0, and hence (39) > 0 and
thus (28) > 0: investors always value some market opacity, i.e., αI > 0. To characterize ε
I
m,
rearrange (39) = 0 as:
0 =
H (ρt)λ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] + g (ct) ∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
. (40)
Substitute εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
into (40), then divide by H(ρt) and rearrange:
0 =
λ
f (k)
[
εa
(
δf (k)− ct
ct
)
− 1
]
+ εm
g (ct)
G(ct)2
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
; (41)
=
λ
f (k)
[
εa
(
δf (k)− ct
ct
)
− 1
]
+ εmεa
1
G(ct)ct
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
;
⇒ −
(
λG (ct)
ct
f(k)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
)[
δf (k)− ct
ct
− 1
εa
]
= εm.
The expression for εIm follows directly from λG (ct)
ct
f(k)
= ∂piA
∂H(ρt)
. When investors value a
binding disclosure threshold, i.e., when αI < α
∗, it satisfies εm = εIm.
Activist. Expected net activist profits are given in (30). Differentiating yields
d
dα
{H (ρt)λG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]} (42)
=
[
H(ρt)λG (ct) +
dH (ρt)
dct
λG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MA
]
dct
dα
.
where dct
dα
= ∂ct
∂α
+ ∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α
was derived in the proof of Proposition 4. Because MA < 0, man-
agerial feedback reduces the marginal profits from increasing α to the activist.
Since (42) > 0 at α = 0, the activist always benefits from some market opacity, i.e., αA >
0. If no interior solution exists, then the activist does not want a disclosure threshold, i.e.,
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αA ≥ α∗. Set (42) = 0 to derive εAm, and recall that dctdα > 0 for α < α∗. Thus, (42) = 0 implies
H(ρt) +
dH(ρt)
dct
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] = 0. (43)
Substitute dH(ρt)
dct
= g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
, εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
into (43) and divide by
H(ρt):
0 = 1 + g(ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
1
H(ρt)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] (44)
= 1 +
g (ct)
G (ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
G (ct)
H(ρt)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]
= 1 + εmεa
[
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]
.
The characterization of εAm follows directly.
Regulator. The regulator’s net expected payoff is given by (33). Differentiating with respect
to α yields the marginal payoff to the regulator of increasing the activist’s position:
dpiV
dct
dct
dα
f(k) + piV f
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
− r ∂k
∂α
− dH(ρt)
dct
λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
(45)
−H(ρt)λg (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
−H (ρt)λG (ct) g (ct)
G (ct)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] dct
dα
.
Substitute the equilibrium relationship piIf
′ (k)− r = 0 and piV = piI + piA to rearrange the
regulator’s marginal payoff from increasing α as:
(45) =
dpiV
dct
dct
dα
f(k) + piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
(46)
−dH(ρt)
dct
λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
−H (ρt)λg (ct) ctdct
dα
= −dH(ρt)
dct
[
δf(k) [1− λG (ct)] + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
]dct
dα
+H (ρt)λg (ct) [δf(k)− ct]dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
,
where the second equality follows from dpiV
dct
= H (ρt) δλg (ct) − dH(ρt)dct δ [1− λG (ct)]. Rear-
38
ranging further yields:
(45) =
[
H (ρt)λg (ct) [δf(k)− ct] +MR
]dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
, (47)
where MR ≡ −dH(ρt)
dct
[
δf(k)[1− λG (ct)] + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
]
.
This equation corresponds to the characterization in (19). Since MR > 0, managerial feed-
back increases the marginal profitability to the regulator of increasing the activist’s position.
To ease exposition, we define Ψ ≡ − ∂piV
∂H(ρt)
f(k) + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] so that MR =
−dH(ρt)
dct
Ψ. Moreover, recall that dH(ρt)
dct
= g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
. Substituting, rewrite (47) as:
0 =
[
−∂H (ρt)
∂G (ct)
g (ct) Ψ +H(ρt)λg (ct) (δf(k)− ct)
]
dct
dα
+ piA
df(k)
dα
(48)
= g (ct) (δf(k)− ct)− g (ct)
G (ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G (ct)
G (ct)
H (ρt)
Ψ
λ
+
piA
H (ρt)λ
df(k)/dα
dct/dα
= εa
(
δf(k)− ct
ct
)
G (ct)− εmεa Ψ
λct
+
piA
H (ρt)λ
df(k)/dα
dct/dα
= εa
(
δf(k)− ct
ct
)
− εmεa Ψ
λG (ct) ct
+
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dct/dα
ct
= −εm + λG (ct) ct
Ψ
[
δf(k)− ct
ct
+
1
εa
( df(k)/dα
f(k)
dct/dα
ct
)]
,
where the third line uses εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
. To derive εRm note in the last
line of (48) that using piV = piI + piA we obtain
λG (ct) ct
Ψ
=
[
−
∂piI
∂H(ρt)
f(k)
λG (ct) ct
−
∂piA
∂H(ρt)
f(k)
λG (ct) ct
+
E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]−1
(49)
=
[
− ∂piI/∂H (ρt)
∂piA/∂H (ρt)
− ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]−1
.
Cutoff relation. The analysis above rearranges the marginal payoffs to market participants
of increasing α. When second-order conditions hold, (i) activist marginal profits are decreas-
ing at α∗ when ε∗m < ε
∗A
m ; (ii) investors’ marginal profits are decreasing at α
∗ if ε∗Im < ε
∗
m;
(iii) the regulator’s marginal payoff is decreasing at α∗ when ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m.
Next, we show that εAm < ε
I
m < ε
R
m. Because the marginal profits of all market agents
are positive at α = 0, εm ∈ (εAm, εIm) when α = 0. It follows that if second-order conditions
hold, when investors want a binding disclosure threshold, activists do not and vice versa.
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Moreover, no party wants a binding disclosure threshold if ε∗m ∈ [εA∗m , εI∗m ].
To see that εAm < ε
I
m, note that the relation is equivalent to
1
εa
(
−∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
− ct
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
)
< −
(
∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
)[
δf (k)− ct
ct
]
. (50)
The left-hand side of (50) is negative because
−∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
= −
λG (ct)
ct
f(k)
−
[
[1− λG (ct)]δ + λG (ct) ctf(k)
] ∈ (0, 1),
whereas ct
ct−E[c|c≤ct] > 1. The right-hand side of (50) is positive because ∂piA/∂H (ρt) > 0,
whereas ∂piI/∂H (ρt) < 0, so we have ε
A
m < ε
I
m.
To see that εIm < ε
R
m, note that a necessary condition for ε
R
m < 0 is that investment de-
crease with α, i.e., df(k)
dα
= f ′(k) ∂k
∂α
< 0, which implies that activist marginal profits decrease
and thus εIm < εm. Hence, if ε
R
m = 0, then ε
I
m < εm < 0. That is, the sole cost to society of
increasing trading transfers is a reduction in real investment, while the benefits exceed those
for investors. Thus, for εRm < εm, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that ε
I
m < εm, which
implies εRm < ε
I
m.
6.5.1 The uniform-uniform case
We show that when both c and ρ are uniformly distributed, second-order conditions hold.
Investors. We rewrite the first-order condition for investors in (40), first substituting in the
uniform distribution of the manager’s cost of reputation, and then the uniform distribution
of the activist’s cost of intervention. Substituting H(ρt) =
ρt
R
and h(ρt) =
1
R
, (40) becomes:
0 =
ϕ
R
[
1− λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(ρt)
λ
f(k)
[g(ct)(δf(k)− ct)−G(ct)] (51)
+
ϕ
R
[
g(ct)
λG(ct)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∂H(ρt)/∂ct
[
δ(1− λG(ct)) + λG(ct) ct
f(k)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∂piI/∂H(ρt)
.
Multiplying (51) by R
ϕ
[
λG(ct)
1−λG(ct)
]
f(k)
λ
yields an equivalent condition
0 = g(ct)(δf(k)− ct)−G(ct) +
[
g(ct)
λG(ct)
] [
δf(k) +
λG(ct)
1− λG(ct)ct
]
, (52)
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which we multiply yet again by 1
g(ct)
and rearrange to obtain
0 = δf(k)
[
1 + λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
+ ct
[
λG(ct)
1− λG(ct)
]
− G(ct)
g(ct)
. (53)
Substituting G(ct) =
ct
C
and g(ct) =
1
C
, the first-order condition (53) for investors becomes
0 = δf(k)
[
C + λct
λct
]
+ ct
[
λct
C − λct
]
− ct (54)
We prove that there is a unique solution to the first-order condition for investors by
showing that the right-hand side (RHS) of (54) decreases in ct. Differentiating yields
d
dct
RHS(54) =
(
C
C − λct
)2
− δf(k)C
λc2t
− 2
=
(
1
1− λG(ct)
)2
− δf(k)
λG(ct)ct
− 2, (55)
where the second line uses G(ct) = ct/C for ct ≤ C. Notice that (55) is negative for ct → 0
and increasing in ct. We derive an upper bound for ct and show that
d
dct
RHS(54) < 0 for such
trading transfers, establishing that the solution to the first-order condition is unique. Trad-
ing profits ct are maximized by the position α
∗∗ in (25) and with the highest liquidity shock
b = 1. Substituting into the expression for ct in (8) yields an implicit upper bound on ct:
ct ≤
(1− λG(ct))
(
1−√1−H(ρt)λG(ct))(H(ρt)λG(ct) +√1−H(ρt)λG(ct)− 1) δf(k)
H(ρt)(λG(ct))2
√
1−H(ρt)λG(ct)
=
(1− λG(ct))
H(ρt)(λG(ct))2
[
2− 2
√
1−H(ρt)λG(ct)−H(ρt)λG(ct)
]
δf(k) (56)
A simpler (and weaker) upper bound on ct follows from considering the maximum value of
the numerator in (56), i.e.,
ct ≤ (1− λG(ct))
H(ρt)(λG(ct))2
2δf(k)
= (1− λG(ct))R
ϕ
(
λG(ct)
1− λG(ct)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/H(ρt)
2δf(k)
(λG(ct))2
, (57)
or equivalently,
ϕ
2R
≤ δf(k)
λG(ct)ct
. (58)
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Plugging (58) in (55) and comparing the first two terms reveals that a sufficient condition
for d
dct
RHS(54) < 0 is (
1
1− λG(ct)
)2
≤ ϕ
2R
. (59)
The condition 2R < ϕ(1− λ)2 follows.
Activist. Substitute H(ρt) =
ρt
R
and h(ρt) =
1
R
to rewrite the activist’s first-order condition
(43) as:
0 =
ϕ
R
[
1− λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(ρt)
+
(
−ϕ
R
g(ct)
λG(ct)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂H(ρt)/∂ct
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] (60)
Multiplying (60) by R
ϕ
[
λG(ct)
1−λG(ct)
]
yields a simpler, equivalent condition
0 = 1−
[
g(ct)
G(ct)
](
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
1− λG(ct)
)
. (61)
Substitute G(ct) =
ct
C
and g(ct) =
1
C
and note that ct − E [c|c ≤ ct] = ct2 . It follows that
the activist’s first-order condition satisfies
0 = 1− 1
2
(
C
C − λct
)
. (62)
The right-hand side decreases in ct, implying a unique solution.
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7 Appendix B: Allowing for pure informed trading
We relax the assumption that the activist can only take a position when the manager im-
plements the bad business plan and show that it does not qualitatively alter our results. We
reproduce the analysis of the market in Section 2.1 assuming that at t = 2, if the activist
observes the company, which occurs with probability λ, he can take a position, regardless of
the business plan implemented by the manager at t = 1.
Proposition 8 At t = 2, the market maker posts prices
P (ω) = Pl ≡
[
2[1−z(1−λG(c∗t ))δ]−zλG(c∗t )−(1−z)λ
2−zλG(c∗t )−(1−z)λ
]
f(k) if ω ≤ 0
P (ω) = Ph ≡ f (k) if ω > 0.
(63)
If the activist (a) observes managerial malfeasance (m = 0) and the activism cost satisfies
c ≤ c∗t = z
[
1− λG(c∗t )
2− zλG(c∗t )− (1− z)λ
]
b
2
δf(k), (64)
or (b) observes that the manager behaves (m = 1); then he takes position
α∗ =
b
2
, (65)
and disciplines management in situation (a). Otherwise the activist does not participate.
We provide the full proof at the end of this section; here we discuss the differences with
the model in the main text. Case (a) is equivalent to the setting studied in Section 2.1. The
activist intervenes to discipline management if the conditional trading profits of doing so
(weakly) outweigh the cost of intervention, i.e., if c ≤ c∗t . Case (b) captures the difference
from the benchmark model, as the activist can acquire stock when the manager behaves
(m = 1). It reveals an intuitive result:
Corollary 9 Pure informed trading occurs if and only if the activist observes that the man-
ager implemented the good business plan. Therefore, it has unconditional probability (1−z)λ.
When the activist observes the good plan, he can profit from his information advantage
(trading profits) without incurring activism costs. Thus, he always takes a position. More-
over, the activist would never act as a mere informed trader after observing the bad plan.
This would imply acquiring overvalued stock, and has negative expected profits.
Notably, when the activist acts as a mere informed trader, he takes the same position
α∗ = b/2. Whether he intends to discipline management or not, a position of b/2 maximizes
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trading profits. If management misbehaves, the activist only participates if these trading
profits outweigh the cost of intervention. If management behaves, he always participates
(upon observing management’s action).
A positive net order flow ω > 0 reveals the activist, and activist participation is associated
to certain cash flows f(k) —as in the benchmark model. This is because additional participa-
tion only occurs if the business plan is good —case (b). A weakly negative order flow ω ≤ 0
is consistent with both activist absence and participation. Corollary 9 highlights that the
new assumption increases informed trading, but only when the good plan is implemented. A
negative order flow is now associated with smaller project expected cash flows and thus Pl is
lower than in the benchmark model. This increases the conditional expected trading profits
of the activist c∗t and in turn his participation after observing managerial malfeasance G(c
∗
t ).
Proposition 10 The expected value at t = 0 of the project given investment k is
E [V ] = [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ]f(k) ≡ piV f(k). (66)
Expected gross profits of the activist are:
E[ΠA] = [(1− z)λ+ zλG(c∗t )]
c∗t
f(k)
f(k) ≡ piAf(k). (67)
Expected gross profits of uninformed investors are:
E[ΠI ] = (piV − piA)f(k) ≡ piIf(k). (68)
Investment by uninformed investors k solves
piIf
′ (k)− r = 0. (69)
The proof follows directly from that of Proposition 2 in the text and the subseqent dis-
cussion. Given initial investment, the project has the same value E[V ] as in the benchmark
setting—Proposition 2. The new assumption alters the distribution of revenues between
investors and the activist. Equation (67) reveals that the activist, in addition to obtaining
larger conditional trading profits (bigger c∗t ), also obtains them with higher probability. In
particular, trading transfers are realized if either (a) the activist disciplines management,
which occurs with probability zλG(c∗t ); or (b) the activist acts as a mere informed trader,
which has probability (1 − z)λ. It follows that piI is smaller than in Proposition 2 and
therefore investment levels captured by (69) are lower, too.
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7.1 Proof of Proposition 8
Market maker. Let α̂ be the market maker’s conjecture about the size of the activist’s
trade, which is correct in equilibrium, and let ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) be his conjecture about the cost
participation threshold.
The activist does not participate if either he does not observe the business plan, or
he observes that the bad plan is implemented but it is too costly to intervene. When
the activist does not does not participate, the order flow is negative with certainty, i.e.,
Pr[ω ≤ 0|a1] =
∫ b
0
1
b
dl = 1. Conversely, the activist participates if he observes the plan and
either the manager implemented the good business plan, or she implemented the bad busi-
ness plan and the cost of intervention is sufficiently small. The probability of a negative net
order flow when the activist participates is Pr[ω ≤ 0|a1] =
∫ b
α
1
b
dl = b−α
b
. From Bayes rule,
Pr[a1|ω ≤ 0] =
[(1− z)λ+ zλG(ĉt)]
(
b−α̂
b
)
[(1− z)λ+ zλG(ĉt)]
(
b−α̂
b
)
+ (1− z)(1− λ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))
, (70)
and
Pr[V = f(k)|a0] = (1− z)(1− λ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))(1− δ)
(1− z)(1− λ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))(1− δ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))δ
=
(1− z)(1− λ) + z(1− λG(ĉt))(1− δ)
(1− z)(1− λ) + z(1− λG(ĉt)) . (71)
Substituting (70) and (71) into (5) and using Pr[a0|ω ≤ 0] = 1− Pr[a1|ω ≤ 0] yields
Pl(α̂) =
b− α̂zλG(ĉt)− α̂(1− z)λ− bz(1− λG(ĉt))δ
b− α̂zλG(ĉt)− α̂(1− z)λ , (72)
which, evaluated at the equilibrium position α∗ = b/2, yields Pl in (64).
Activist. The activist’s gross expected profits from participating do not depend on whether
he intervenes to discipline to discipline management incurring cost c, or if he acts as a mere
informed trader after observing the good business plan, which is costless. Gross expected
profits are therefore given by (7) and maximized by α∗ = b/2. Upon observing the bad
business plan m = 0, the activist participates if and only if c ≤ E[ΠA|a1], implying that the
intervention cost cut-off satisfies ct = E[ΠA|a1]. Substituting Pl(α) in (72) into E[ΠA|a1] and
noting that the market maker’s conjecture is correct in equilibrium yields
ct = (b− α)αz
[
1− λG (ct)
b− αzλG (ct)− α(1− z)λ
]
δf(k), (73)
which, evaluated at α = α∗, reads as c∗t in Proposition 8.
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8 Appendix C: Alternative Trading Environment
In this section we develop an alternative formulation of the trading market and show that
our qualitative results are preserved.
At t = 2, initial investors receive liquidity shocks that force them to sell shares. For
tractability reasons, we follow Edmans (2009) and assume that liquidity shocks are expo-
nentially distributed: liquidity shock l has density
y(l) =
{
µe−µl if l ≥ 0
0 if l < 0
. (74)
To translate this to our framework we assume that when investors receive shock l, they
must sell collectively a share γY (l) of the firm, where Y (l) = 1 − e−µl is the cumulative
distribution of liquidity shock l. If the activist observes managerial malfeasance and decides
to participate, it chooses to acquire share γY (α) of the firm. The market maker observes
ω = α − l, but not its components, and sets a price that breaks even in expectation, i.e.,
setting price equal to the expected project payoffs.
Other than the new trading environment, assumptions remain unchanged. We solve the
model recursively, following the steps detailed in Section 2.
Proposition 11 At t = 2, if the activist observes managerial malfeasance (m = 0) and the
activism cost satisfies
c ≤ c∗t = z
[
1− λG(c∗t )
2− zλG(c∗t )
]
γ
2
δf(k); (75)
then he takes a position γY (α∗) = γ
2
, which corresponds to
α∗ =
ln(2)
µ
, (76)
and disciplines management. Otherwise, the activist does not participate.
The market maker, upon observing ω = α− l, sets prices
P (ω) = Pl ≡
[
2[1−z(1−λG(c∗t ))δ]−zλG(c∗t )
2−zλG(c∗t )
]
f (k) if ω ≤ 0
P (ω) = Ph ≡ f (k) if ω > 0.
(77)
A full proof is provided later; here we provide the intuition and link it to the benchmark
model. If ω > 0, the market maker knows with certainty that the activist took a position
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and the project pays off f(k). If ω ≤ 0, the expected project value is
Pl(α) =
[
1− zλG(ct)Y (α)− z(1− λG(ct))δ
1− zλG(ct)Y (α)
]
f(k). (78)
The activist’s trade off between the number of undervalued shares that he may acquire γY (α)
and the expected cost of information revelation
∫∞
α
y(l)dl = 1 − Y (α) is analogous to the
benchmark setting. His expected gross profits conditional on buying γY (α) shares are
E[ΠA|a1] = [1− Y (α)]γY (α) [f(k)− Pl] . (79)
Expected gross profits are maximized by α∗ = ln(2)/µ, which corresponds to a position
γY (α∗) = γ/2. The activist’s cost participation cut-off is pinned down by E[ΠA|a1] = ct:
ct = [1− Y (α)]γY (α)z
[
1− λG(ct)
1− zλG(ct)Y (α)
]
δf(k), (80)
and takes the form in (75) when evaluated at the optimal position of α∗ = ln(2)/µ. The
cut-off ct is unique and the activist employs a threshold strategy. Moreover, Y (α
∗) = 1/2,
which plugged in (78) yields Pl in (77).
Note that Pl(α) decreases with α: the market feedback described in Proof of Proposition
1 is also present in this environment and the analogue intuition applies, i.e., the activist
would benefit from committing to a more aggressive trade before stock prices are posted.
Subsequent analysis . Proposition 2 remains unchanged with respect to the main text:
in expectation the project’s gross expected profits are split in different proportions between
uninformed investors and the activist. These proportions are determined by trading transfers
in equilibrium c∗t , which provide a role for blockholder disclosure thresholds. The analysis of
optimal policies follows.
8.1 Proof of Proposition 11.
Let α̂ be the market maker’s conjecture about the activist’s trade, which is correct in equilib-
rium. Let ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) be the analogous conjecture about his cost participation threshold. The
market maker observes ω. Given ω, either (i) the activist did not take a position and l = −ω;
or (ii) the activist participates and l = −ω + α̂. From our assumptions it follows that the
unconditional probability that the activist does not participate is [1 − zλG(ĉt)]y(−ω), and
the unconditional probability that he participates is zλG (ĉt) y(−ω+ α̂). Thus, the expected
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project value is
E[V ] =
[
y(−ω)(1− z) + y(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt)
y(−ω)(1− z) + y(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) + y(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
f(k) (81)
+
[
y(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
y(−ω)(1− z) + y(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) + y(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
(1− δ)f(k).
Suppose the market maker observes ω > 0. Then y(−ω) = 0, and the activist partici-
pates with certainty so P (ω) = Ph. If, instead, ω ≤ 0, the market maker does not know
whether the activist participates, with y(−ω + α̂) = µeµ(ω−α̂) and y(−ω) = µeµω. The term
µeµω cancels out of the numerator and denominator. Using Y (α) = 1− e−µα yields (78).
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